2020
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1822424
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Desire and What It’s Rational to Do

Abstract: It is often taken for granted that our desires can contribute to what it is rational for us to do. This paper examines an account of desire that promises an explanation of this datum, the guise of the good. I argue that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of how a class of desires-basic desire-contribute to practical rationality. I develop an alternative guise-of-the-good account on which basic desires attune us to our reasons for action in virtue of their biological funct… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…Desires also have a phenomenological role, especially in connection with affective phenomenology, and human and animal desires are connected to our biological drives. Chang (2004) and Shaw (2021) appeal to these features in accounts of the significance of desire for action for reasons, and they are likely to be absent in many or all artificial RL systems.…”
Section: Action For Reasonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Desires also have a phenomenological role, especially in connection with affective phenomenology, and human and animal desires are connected to our biological drives. Chang (2004) and Shaw (2021) appeal to these features in accounts of the significance of desire for action for reasons, and they are likely to be absent in many or all artificial RL systems.…”
Section: Action For Reasonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hume's conclusion is that ultimately no preference can be challenged or justified. We can “diagnose and defuse” this kind of nihilism by appealing to the etiology of primitive motivational states (cf., Shaw, 2021). The bodily urges are reasons for actions.…”
Section: Conclusion: Empiricism Dogmatism and Bodily Urgesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for THEORIA for raising this concern. 5 Some authors seem to conceive standing desires as dispositional states that last a long time and contrast them to occurrent desires, which would only last for a short period of time and would consist in a phenomenally conscious state (see for instanceDöring and Ekker, 2017;Butlin, 2017;Shaw, 2020). I think this is wrong.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%