Detecting malicious modifications of data in third-party intellectual property cores

Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; Vedula, V.M.; Karri, Ramesh

doi:10.1145/2744769.2744823

Cited by 99 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Using these tools and metrics, we generated a large number of trust benchmarks, which are available at trust-hub.org for researchers to evaluate their detection techniques. These benchmarks are now currently being used in developing the state-of-the-art in hardware Trojan detection techniques [12,21,25,28,38,39]. As part of our future work, we plan to expand the current benchmarks to fit more attack models, develop Trojan benchmarks and also, add newer benchmarks to the repository to enhance outcomes of Trojan detection research.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

et al. 2017

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Research in the field of hardware Trojans has seen significant growth in the past decade. However, standard benchmarks to evaluate hardware Trojans and their detection are lacking. To this end, we have developed a suite of Trojans and 'trust benchmarks' (i.e., benchmark circuits with a hardware Trojan inserted in them) that can be used by researchers in the community to compare and contrast various Trojan detection techniques. In this paper, we present a comprehensive vulnerability analysis flow at various levels of abstraction of digital-design, that has been utilized to create these trust benchmarks. Further, we present a detailed evaluation of our benchmarks in terms of metrics such as Trojan detectability, and in the context of different attack

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

et al. 2017

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“…The security properties that are proved may include preventing host software from modifying the internal elements of security controller IP, disabling the firmware from reading the encryption/decryption key from the hardware, and accessing privileged memory or I/O directly, while running in the user mode. Security properties can verify presence of Trojans that either modify the function or leak sensitive information [52,53].…”

Section: Malicious Verification Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

CAD-Base

Basu

Saeed

Pilato

et al. 2019

ACM Trans. Des. Autom. Electron. Syst.

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Fabless semiconductor companies design system-on-chips (SoC) by using third-party intellectual property (IP) cores and fabricate them in offshore, potentially untrustworthy foundries. Owing to the globally distributed electronics supply chain, security has emerged as a serious concern. In this article, we explore electronics computer-aided design (CAD) software as a threat vector that can be exploited to introduce vulnerabilities into the SoC. We show that all electronics CAD tools-high-level synthesis, logic synthesis, physical design, verification, test, and post-silicon validation-are potential threat vectors to different degrees. We have demonstrated CAD-based attacks on several benchmarks, including the commercial ARM Cortex M0 processor [1].

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“…This has been demonstrated to detect data leakage [24] and malicious modifications to registers [25]. More recently, conventional verification techniques are used to detect data leakage [26] and malicious modifications to registers [27].…”

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Trustworthy Systems Using Untrusted Components: A High-Level Synthesis Approach

Rajendran

Sinanoglu

Karri

2016

IEEE Trans. VLSI Syst.

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Trustworthiness of system-on-chip designs is undermined by malicious logic (Trojans) in third-party intellectual properties (3PIPs). In this paper, duplication, diversity, and isolation principles have been extended to detect build trustworthy systems using untrusted, potentially Trojan-infected 3PIPs. We use a diverse set of vendors to prevent collusions between the 3PIPs from the same vendor. We identify design constraints for Trojan detection to achieving detection, collusion prevention, and isolating the Trojan-infected 3PIP, and incorporate them during high-level synthesis. In addition, we develop techniques to reduce the number of vendors. The effectiveness of the proposed techniques is validated using the high-level synthesis benchmarks.

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Detecting malicious modifications of data in third-party intellectual property cores

Cited by 99 publications

References 24 publications

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

Benchmarking of Hardware Trojans and Maliciously Affected Circuits

CAD-Base

Building Trustworthy Systems Using Untrusted Components: A High-Level Synthesis Approach

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