Detecting Selfish Backoff Attack in IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA Using Logistic Classification

Repeated Game Analysis of a CSMA/CA Network under a Backoff Attack

“…We assume that the server is able to perfectly detect misbehavior of the stations, although that detection has a cost to the server, in terms of delay in the forwarding of the package and computational resources. Regarding the detection mechanism, there are many possible choices that could be used, such as the ones presented in References [12] or [14].…”

“…In case of using mixed strategies, we take mathematical expectations in Equation (14). V i (w) is called continuation promise.…”

“…We use the same idea that lies behind Proposition 1 as in Reference [28]. We define a static game which is equivalent to the repeated game using Bellman's equation, as in (14). The automaton representation holds in the CE case with minor modifications, the main difference regarding the SPE case being that now we use the CE condition [18].…”

“…In Reference [10], there is a survey on game theory approaches to multiple access situations in wireless networks and Reference [11] contains another survey more concretely focused on CSMA. Other works studying wireless networks under backoff attacks are References [12][13][14]. In Reference [13], the authors characterize two different families of Nash equilibria that arise in this situation and Reference [14] is devoted to the detection of such attacks.…”

“…Other works studying wireless networks under backoff attacks are References [12][13][14]. In Reference [13], the authors characterize two different families of Nash equilibria that arise in this situation and Reference [14] is devoted to the detection of such attacks. In Reference [12], the author proposes a strategy to face a selfish backoff behavior, called CRISP and provides simulations of its performance, although it assumes that all agents have the same target, assumption that we drop.…”