Detection and Localization of PMU Time Synchronization Attacks via Graph Signal Processing

Shereen, Ezzeldin; Ramakrishna, Raksha; Dán, György

doi:10.1109/tsg.2022.3150954

Cited by 17 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…As a result, Step 8 in Algorithm 1 is replaced with "compute: d = (I − 2αf 2 (L))c (q) i ". In particular, we can obtain the following two special cases: 1) if the GHPF is selected as (7), then we obtain the same result provided by the graph TV measure, described above and summarized in Algorithm 1; and 2) if the GHPF is selected as (11), the result will be a k-graph frequencies attack, as defined in [51].…”

Section: Remarks 1) Known Topologymentioning

confidence: 90%

“…GSP theory includes methods such as the Graph Fourier Transform (GFT), graph filters [44]- [46], and sampling and recovery of graph signals [47]- [49]. By leveraging the graphical properties of the states in PSSE, the works in [39], [40], [50], [51] present GSPbased detectors that are able to detect existing unobservable FDI attacks. The advantages of GSP-based detection methods include their ability to operate with limited data, lack of restrictive assumptions on the adversary's capabilities, and greater resilience to minor changes in the system's topology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The advantages of GSP-based detection methods include their ability to operate with limited data, lack of restrictive assumptions on the adversary's capabilities, and greater resilience to minor changes in the system's topology. While [51] defines a low-pass FDI attack in the graph frequency domain based on the graph representation of the power system, there is no practical method for generating an FDI attack that exploits the graphical properties of the states. Therefore, the vulnerability of existing GSP-based detection methods to such attacks has not been fully investigated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Structural-Constrained Methods for the Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems

Morgenstern

Routtenberg

2022

IEEE Access

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Power system functionality is determined on the basis of power system state estimation (PSSE). Thus, corruption of the PSSE may lead to severe consequences, such as disruptions in electricity distribution, maintenance damage, and financial losses. Classical bad data detection (BDD) methods, developed to ensure PSSE reliability, are unable to detect well-designed attacks, named unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper, we develop novel structural-constrained methods for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks and the identification of the attacked buses. The proposed methods are based on formulating structural, sparse constraints on both the attack and the system loads. First, we exploit these constraints in order to compose an appropriate model selection problem. Then, we develop the associated generalized information criterion (GIC) for this problem. However, the GIC method's computational complexity grows exponentially with the network size, which may be prohibitive for large networks. Therefore, based on the proposed structural and sparse constraints, we develop two novel lowcomplexity methods for the practical identification of unobservable FDI attacks: 1) a modification of the state-of-the-art orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) method; and 2) a method that utilizes the graph Markovian property in power systems, i.e. the second-neighbor relationship between the power data at the system's buses. In order to analyze the performance of the proposed methods, the appropriate oracle and clairvoyant detectors are also derived. The performance of the proposed methods is evaluated on the IEEE-30 bus test case. INDEX TERMSAttack detection and identification, false data injection (FDI) attacks, graph Markovian property, model selection, structural constraints,

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Section: Remarks 1) Known Topologymentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Structural-Constrained Methods for the Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems

Morgenstern

Routtenberg

2022

IEEE Access

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“… 2013 ; Shereen et al. 2022 ). Furthermore, the propagation of tampered substations within a WAN has the potential to impact all synchronized substations, resulting in inaccurate metering, disruptions to state estimation, and significant socio-economic or operational impacts (Wang et al.…”

Section: Cyber Attacks In Sgmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study of smart grid cyber-security, examining architectures, communication networks, cyber-attacks, countermeasure techniques, and challenges

Achaal,

Adda,

Berger

et al. 2024

Cybersecurity

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Smart Grid (SG) technology utilizes advanced network communication and monitoring technologies to manage and regulate electricity generation and transport. However, this increased reliance on technology and connectivity also introduces new vulnerabilities, making SG communication networks susceptible to large-scale attacks. While previous surveys have mainly provided high-level overviews of SG architecture, our analysis goes further by presenting a comprehensive architectural diagram encompassing key SG components and communication links. This holistic view enhances understanding of potential cyber threats and enables systematic cyber risk assessment for SGs. Additionally, we propose a taxonomy of various cyberattack types based on their targets and methods, offering detailed insights into vulnerabilities. Unlike other reviews focused narrowly on protection and detection, our proposed categorization covers all five functions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework. This delivers a broad perspective to help organizations implement balanced and robust security. Consequently, we have identified critical research gaps, especially regarding response and recovery mechanisms. This underscores the need for further investigation to bolster SG cybersecurity. These research needs, among others, are highlighted as open issues in our concluding section.

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“…A notable example is the receiver-spoofer mechanism [28], wherein the spoofer masquerades as a GPS receiver, manipulates authentic GPS signals, and transmits spoofed signals to the target. Both space-based time synchronization (SBTS) and network-based time synchronization (NBTS) mechanisms [29] lack integrated security controls, rendering them highly susceptible to TSAs.…”

Section: B Time Synchronization Attacks (Tsas)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-physical testbeds for smart grid and electric vehicle-charging infrastructure

Gupta

Panigrahi

Sahoo

et al. 2022

Cyber Security for Microgrids

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Power electronic systems (PES) face significant threats from various data availability and integrity attacks, significantly affecting the performance of communication networks and power system operation. As a result, several attack detection and reconstruction techniques are deployed, which makes it a costly & complex cybersecurity operational platform with significant room for incremental extensions for mitigation against future threats. Unlike the said traditional arrangements, our paper introduces a foundational approach by establishing a monolithic cybersecurity architecture (MCA) via incorporating semantic principles into the sampling process for distributed energy resources (DERs). This unified approach concurrently compensates for the intrusion challenges posed by cyber attacks by reconstructing signals using the dynamics of the inner control layer. This reconstruction considers essential semantic attributes, like Priority, Freshness, and Relevance to ensure resilient dynamic performance. Hence, the proposed scheme promises a generalized route to concurrently tackle a global set of cyber attacks in elevating the resilience of PES. Finally, rigorous validation on a modified IEEE 69-bus distribution system and a real-world South California Edison (SCE) 47-bus network, using OPAL-RT under diverse operating conditions, underscores its robustness, modelfree design capability, scalability, and adaptability to dynamic cyber graphs and system reconfiguration.

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Detection and Localization of PMU Time Synchronization Attacks via Graph Signal Processing

Cited by 17 publications

References 49 publications

Structural-Constrained Methods for the Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems

Structural-Constrained Methods for the Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems

Study of smart grid cyber-security, examining architectures, communication networks, cyber-attacks, countermeasure techniques, and challenges

Cyber-physical testbeds for smart grid and electric vehicle-charging infrastructure

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