Determinants of Compliance Difficulties among ‘Good Compliers’: Implementation of International Human Rights Rulings in the Czech Republic

Kosař, David; Petrov, Jan

doi:10.1093/ejil/chy028

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Finland can be seen as an example of liberalism. Kosař and Petrov [ 77 ] stated that the level of compliance depends on a repeated balancing exercise, in which domestic political actors balance the domestic political costs of compliance against the international reputational costs of non-compliance. Cerna [ 78 ] summarizes different approaches influencing policy implementation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Slovakia and in Finland: Two Different Worlds

Pavlíková

Freel

Dijk

2020

IJERPH

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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) developed by the State Parties to the World Health Organization was ratified in Slovakia in 2004 and in Finland in 2005. The aim of this study was to explore and compare compliance with the FCTC in Finland and Slovakia. This is a two-country comparative study of tobacco control policy based on implementation of the FCTC in Slovakia and Finland. Compliance with the FCTC was measured similarly in Slovakia and Finland in terms of their institutional structure supporting a smoking free environment and implementation of selected articles of the FCTC. In Finland the responsibilities for anti-tobacco policy are clearly assigned. Slovakia does not have specifically responsible institutions. Finland has a clear plan for achieving the goal of a smoking-free country based on empirical evidence. Slovakia meets only the minimum standard resulting from its commitment as ratified in the FCTC and data are out of date or missing completely.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Slovakia and in Finland: Two Different Worlds

Pavlíková

Freel

Dijk

2020

IJERPH

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“…This entails, among other things, that the Court has institutional reasons to pay heed to issues such as the reception of its doctrine by domestic judges, as well as the compliance of state authorities both with the specific operative provisions of its judgments in each instant case and with the more general doctrinal interpretations of the Convention that underpin those provisions. In order to do so, it must have at least some idea of domestic institutions' realistically construed capacities and motivational propensities (Kosař and Petrov 2018). Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Court shapes doctrine and decides outcomes with an eye towards aiding its partners in carrying out their functions efficiently within this wider institutional division of labour (Tsarapatsanis 2015, pp.…”

Section: A First Take On Moral Sub-optimality and The Echr: Considerations Of Institutional Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Rights beyond Ideal Morality: The ECHR and Political Judgment

Tsarapatsanis¹

2021

Laws

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The aim of the article is to propose and defend a distinctively political reading of the European Convention of Human Rights. Drawing on a range of different sources, my core claim is that realistically construed considerations of political legitimacy, stemming from the institutional context within which ECtHR judges operate, can explain and justify a morally non-ideal understanding of Convention rights on the part of the Court. I call the kind of non-ideal reading of the ECHR that I defend ‘political’ because it results from distinctive concerns regarding the Court’s legitimacy in a wider context marked by the circumstances of politics, broadly understood. These concerns depend on apprehending the ECHR as a distinctive institutional-cum-legal regime or system whose stability has political underpinnings. Tackling them requires resorting to some form of political judgment aimed at working out how various normative parameters, including legitimacy and stability, interact with a morally ideal (or ‘first-best’) understanding of any given ECHR right.

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“…Whereas in the 1990s the ECtHR's President Ryssdal stated that the ECtHR's case law has "always been complied with," 177 today the Strasbourg Court faces various compliance difficulties, including partial compliance and non-compliance stemming from dilatoriness but also from principled resistance. 178 Accordingly, scholars speak about an implementation crisis in the ECHR system and stress the detrimental effects it has on the Court's caseload and legitimacy. 179 All these developments illustrate the ECtHR's vulnerability in the area of legitimacy challenges.…”

Section: Gradual Erosion Through Shifting the Discourse And Delegitim...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The populist challenge to the European Court of Human Rights

Petrov

2020

International Journal of Constitutional Law

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This article analyzes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from the perspective of the recent extraordinary wave of populism in Europe. It argues that populism poses a serious and distinctive challenge to the ECtHR since supranational judicial review is at odds with the populist ideology. What makes the populist challenge distinctive is the combination of the ideological basis of populism, its wide appeal and capacity to reach ordinary people, and populists’ tendency to remove limitations on their power. With respect to the last point, the article introduces a categorization of anti-court techniques and takes stock of the ECtHR’s institutional setting. It concludes that although the situation is not perfect—the budget and judicial selection are especially problematic—the ECtHR is rather well insulated from eventual attacks targeting its structural features or the judicial personnel. However, including the ECtHR in the “narrative of blame,” populism is very strong in another anti-court strategy—achieving gradual erosion of a court through delegitimization. That is particularly threatening for the ECtHR due to its vulnerability to legitimacy challenges manifested in the past decade. As a result, the populist challenge will likely require careful management of the ECtHR’s social legitimacy.

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Determinants of Compliance Difficulties among ‘Good Compliers’: Implementation of International Human Rights Rulings in the Czech Republic

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Compliance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Slovakia and in Finland: Two Different Worlds

Compliance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Slovakia and in Finland: Two Different Worlds

Human Rights beyond Ideal Morality: The ECHR and Political Judgment

The populist challenge to the European Court of Human Rights

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