Extraordinary limitation of certain fundamental rights seems necessary in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries have declared a state of emergency for that purpose. Yet, there is also a risk of misusing the emergency for power grabbing, especially in the current era of executive aggrandizement, democratic decay and abusive populist constitutionalism. In this setting the legislative and judicial checks on the executive create a dilemma. Their standard operation in the state of emergency could control the executive, but might also impair its capacity to fight the pandemic effectively. This article therefore focuses on the desired role of the legislature and the judiciary in COVID-19 emergencies. Although many constitutions address emergencies, they are often vague and leave considerable room for the involved actors themselves to adjust their behaviour. This article asks how parliaments and courts should use this de facto room. I argue that they should show some deference to the executive, its level depending on the stage and severity of the crisis, but should not clear the field for governments. They must modify their activities but not suspend them. My main argument is that the deliberative and scrutiny functions of the legislature and the disputeresolution function of courts are crucial not only for preventing the abuse of emergency measures, but also for increasing the effectiveness of emergency measures by improving conditions necessary for compliance. The legislature and courts can contribute to the higher feasibility and legitimacy of the emergency measures and thereby increase voluntary compliance, which is crucial for tackling the spread of the new coronavirus. The article illustrates these issues by way of the case study of the Czech Republica country experiencing its first nationwide state of emergency amid tendencies towards democratic decay and managerial populism.

No abstract

No abstract

Implementation of the European Court of Human Rights' case law-Compliance with the European Convention-Role of constitutional courts in implementing the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts and convergence, engagement and resistance to the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts self-correcting their practices to implement the European Court's case law-Changing constitutional courts' procedures and design to implement the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts conducting implementation of the European Court's case law-Constitutional courts evaluating implementation of the European Court's case law-Varying partnership capacity of constitutional courts vis-à-vis the European Court-Factors of partnership capacity: a favourable institutional setting, a favourable political setting and a favourable attitude of a constitutional court towards the European Court's judgment-Seeking implementation partners beyond constitutional courts * Judicial Studies Institute (JUSTIN), Faculty of Law, Masaryk University. I am grateful to John Ferejohn, David Kosař, Davide Paris, Pasquale Pasquino, to the participants in the ECtHR workshop in Barcelona (Pompeu Fabra University), PluriCourts human rights seminar (University of Oslo), JUSTIN research meeting (Masaryk University), and to anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have significantly improved this text. The usual caveats apply. The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant No. 678375-JUDI-ARCH-ERC-2015-STG).

No abstract