Determinants of judged validity

Asking simultaneously about truth and familiarity may disrupt truth effects

“…The fact that there is an association of recognition and truth judgments in the sequential condition and not in the simultaneous could be understood as supporting a referential explanation of the truth effect (e.g., Arkes et al, 1991;Hasher et al, 1977). That is, truth is referential to knowledge and when "knowledge" is attributed to previous exposure in the experimental setting, i.e., in the simultaneous condition, that reference is lost.…”

“…As stated earlier, Begg and collaborators (1992) showed that processing conditions that facilitated recollection were associated with a reduction of the truth effect, supposedly because individuals can identify previous exposure as the probable source of the feeling of familiarity. Arkes and colleagues (Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989;Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991) found that the truth effect is stronger when the source of the feeling of familiarity is dissociated from the experimental context. In addition, older adults seem to be more susceptible to the truth effect because they have impaired source memory and so cannot recognize the real source of the subjective experience associated with familiarity (Law, Hawkins, & Craik, 1998;Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005).…”

“…There are two possible answers to this question. One is that the subjective experience reflects memory and therefore our knowledge about the world, offering a heuristic pathway about the validity of a statement (e.g., Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991). This view finds support, for example, in Bacon's (1979) findings showing a high relationship between memory and truth judgments, i.e., when participants recognized a statement as being repeated from previous sessions its truth-value increased.…”

Judging the Truth-Value of a Statement In and Out of a Deep Processing Context

“…defense and impression management motives are not necessarily related to truth and may easily be achieved through biased processing. Additionally, there is evidence (see Arkes, boehm, & xu, 1991;boehm, 1994) that individual differences, such as the need for cognition (the enjoyment in engaging in effortful analytic processing), have no impact on the magnitude of the illusion of truth, which suggests that not all motivational factors are relevant to the disruption of the effect. As a result, if accuracy motives may compel individuals to rely more on other components than on their subjective experiences, other motives or individual characteristics might not, and individuals might rely on their subjective experiences even when their capacity is not restricted.…”

Paradigma associado ao estudo da ilusão de verdade

“…O efeito é mais acentuado quando a repetição das afirmações é feita palavra por palavra, quando apenas se repete o tópico das frases (e.g., Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991) …”