Determinants of the Army Applicant Job Choice Decision and the Development of a Decision Support Tool for the Enlistment Incentive Review Board

Abstract

The Army offers a variety of enlistment incentives to encourage applicants to choose Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) where the need is greatest. MOS incentive types, levels, amounts, and qualification criteria are determined by the Enlistment Incentive Review Board (EIRB). To help the EIRB effectively and efficiently perform this function, this research reviewed current incentive policy decision making process and tools, estimated a Job Choice Model (JCM) based on actual applicant choice data from the Army's Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) for the first and second quarters of FY 2010, and developed a proof-of-concept Decision Support Tool (DST) based on the JCM for predicting the number of enlistments by MOS and Term of Service (TOS) and associated cost given a user-defined policy scenario. The effects of incentives on applicant enlistment choices estimated by the JCM were intuitive for simple policy changes and more difficult to anticipate for more complex policy changes. The benefit of the JCM is that effects of policy changes on MOS fill and budget can be quantified objectively. The proof-of-concept DST demonstrated the value of a tool for informing the EIRB in allocating incentives to MOS and TOS enlistment options that can provide the most benefit to the Army. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Enlistment Incentive Review Board, Army enlistment incentives, discrete choice modeling, job choice modeling and simulation, Army classification SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19.

Who Should the Military Recruit? The Effects of Institutional, Occupational, and Self-Enhancement Enlistment Motives on Soldier Identification and Behavior

“…Establishing this knowledge is critical because organizations derive substantial value from high-quality relationships and citizenship behaviors from its members (Bhattacharya, Rao, & Glynn, 1995; Sheth & Parvatiyar, 1995). 2 Moreover, while the U.S. military may have a limited role in influencing the goals and aspirations of the nation’s youth (Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002), they shape the distribution of those motives/goals within its membership through the use of incentives, recruiting, and marketing specifically targeting those motives/goals (Diaz et al, 2014). For example, the Army increases the proportion of its membership that plan to attend college by targeting prospective members with college funding incentives.…”

Formulating the Brogden Classification Framework as a Discrete Choice Model

“…First, using data with actual applicant job choices and incentives s, estimate a job choice model with utility equations represents the "observed classification effect" in the data. In previous studies, we found statistically significant classification effects for AA scores of applicants (Diaz, Ingerick, & Sticha, 2007a;Diaz, Ingerick, & Sticha, 2007b;Diaz, Sticha, Hogan, Mackin, & Greenston, 2012). Unlike in the classification problem, the constants s represent average preferences not explained by the incentive and classification composite.…”

“…Note that the general form of this formula is the same as the formula for computing the average bonus in JCM models (Diaz, Ingerick, & Sticha, 2007b;Diaz, Sticha, Hogan, Mackin, & Greenston, 2012). The difference is that here probabilities are derived from optimal assignment rules while the JCM probabilities were derived from actual applicant choices.…”