Deterrence, expected cost, uncertainty and voting: Experimental evidence

Abstract

We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an individual's decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an individual's decision to commit a violation are very difficult to isolate in field data. We use a roadway speeding framing and find that (a) individuals respond considerably to increases in the expected cost of speeding, (b) uncertainty about the enforcement regime yields a significant reduction in violations committed, and (c) people are much more likely to speed when the punishment regime for which they voted is implemented. Our results have important implications for a behavioral theory of deterrence under uncertainty.Keywords Deterrence . Experiment . Uncertainty . Crime and punishment JEL classifications C91 . D03 . D81 . K42The use of deterrence mechanisms-such as the probability of apprehension, fines, jail sentence length, and legal liability-in preventing proscribed activities is theoretically well understood: increases in the expected cost of committing illegal activities will reduce the amount of crimes committed.

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

“…Figure 3 displays the difference between the number of ECU withdrawn by the excluded members and the average withdrawal of their group both in the period of exclusion (left bars) and in the period of reintegration (right bars), by treatment when N>2 (i.e., when the game involves a social dilemma; see a similar figure in Appendix 3 for all groups regardless of their size). 24 We can see that in every treatment, the average difference with the group average is lower during the reintegration period than during the exclusion period. Subjects reintegrated after three periods of exclusion continue to withdraw more than their group average in the reintegration period in both Endo (+1.89) and Exo3P (+2.25), whereas subjects reintegrated after one period of exclusion comply to the norm of the group in Exo1P (+0.35) and withdraw less than the group average in Endo (-0.92) but the variance is also large.…”

“…Third, subjects excluded for a longer duration may attempt at making up after reintegration for lost earnings during exclusion. 24 Although not illustrated on Figure 3 to keep the comparison symmetric, group members excluded for two periods in Endo take on average 0.33 ECU more than their group members in the reintegration period.…”

“…24 Hence, exclusion does not systematically harm efficiency when it is followed by reintegration. This is consistent with Cinyabuguma et al (2005), Sheremeta et al (2011), and Neuhofer and Kittel (2015).…”

The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory

“…On the right hand side, m j A is the utility associated with the donation, 6 and qp is the probability of being punished by mistake (type-I error). Thus, we get…”

Deterrence works for criminals

“…Recent studies provide evidence that an increase in the expected punishment decreases criminal activity of students (e.g. Abbink et al, 2002;DeAngelo and Charness, 2012;Khadjavi, forthcoming;Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003;Rizzolli and Stanca, 2012;Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair, 2012).…”