Deterrence works for criminals

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker's deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game

“…Recent research on a criminal population, for example, has found that inmates respond similarly to risk and deterrence as student populations, although there is a higher percentage of inmates who tend to be risk seeking compared to students. (29) While the criminal population is likely to differ from terrorist populations, this result suggests that research in regards to risk and decision making may have applicability in other populations thought to differ greatly compared to our student population. Second, while individual data on terrorist decision making are scarce, evidence seems to suggest that planners of attacks take into account the expected costs and benefits in their decisions.…”

Experimental criminal law: a survey of contributions from law, economics, and criminology

“…The experimenter endows one participant with an electronic entitlement that is exchanged against real money at the end of the experiment (skirting the doctrinal question whether this constitutes theft or computer fraud). Another participant has the possibility to take some or all of this endowment (Falk and Fischbacher 2002, Gravert 2013, Harbaugh, Mocan et al 2013, Pecenka and Kundhlande 2013, Feess, Schramm et al 2014, Engel and Nagin 2015, Khadjavi 2015, Fleming, Parravano et al 2016. Participants even do so if stealing reduces expected profit (Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair 2012, Engel and Nagin 2015).…”

“…Time series analysis suggests that this increase in the severity of the sanction indeed led to the intended effect (Campbell andRoss 1968, Glass 1968). Khadjavi (2015) tests prison inmates on a game with the threat of sanctions, and finds that they react to the threat, but less so than students. Surprisingly, however, Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair (2012) find an increase in stealing if the expected value of the sanction increases, as long as the expected value of stealing remains positive.…”

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

“…The experimenter endows one participant with an electronic entitlement that is exchanged against real money at the end of the experiment (skirting the doctrinal question whether this constitutes theft or computer fraud). Another participant has the possibility to take some or all of this endowment (Falk and Fischbacher 2002, Gravert 2013, Harbaugh, Mocan et al 2013, Pecenka and Kundhlande 2013, Feess, Schramm et al 2014, Engel and Nagin 2015, Khadjavi 2015, Fleming, Parravano et al 2016. Participants even do so if stealing reduces expected profit (Schildberg-Hörisch andStrassmair 2012, Engel andNagin 2015).…”

“…Time series analysis suggests that this increase in the severity of the sanction indeed led to the intended effect (Campbell andRoss 1968, Glass 1968). Khadjavi (2015) tests prison inmates on a game with the threat of sanctions, and finds that they react to the threat, but less so than students. Surprisingly, however, Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair (2012) find an increase in stealing if the expected value of the sanction increases, as long as the expected value of stealing remains positive.…”