Deterrence in the Age of Thinking Machines

Abstract

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Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?

“…Firstly, any action might be misperceived by a machine on the other end. This may be because of a simple "misunderstanding" or by deliberately setting up a machine in a way that interprets any attempts at de-escalation as a tactical opportunity advantage (Wong et al, 2020). The resulting uncertainty is potentially severely destabilizing, since in a crisis situation, this might lead to an exacerbation of conflict, rather than its mitigation.…”

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?

“…Thus, the uncertainty caused by the introduction of AI into a situation might incentivize states (especially those facing a superior adversary) to delegate decisions to machines for the perceived deterrence effect. 25 Because of the difficulty of demonstrating a posture like this before a crisis or conflict, however, this implicit threat could equally worsen crisis instability. AI systems that are programed to aggressively pursue tactical and operational advantages, for example, might misperceive (or simply ignore) an adversary's bid to signal resolve (i.e., to deescalate a situation), as prelude to an imminent attack.…”

U.S. Military Investments in Autonomy and AI: A Strategic Assessment

“…But when North Korea unexpectedly fired a missile over Japan, the autonomous system not only engaged the missile, but also launched counterbattery fire against North Korea in a move that escalated the crisis. 31 Relying on machines to accelerate decision-action cycles in operational settings can therefore have destabilizing effects.…”