2018
DOI: 10.3386/w25100
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Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions

Abstract: Over 2008 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include ngerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later re-apprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the roll-out of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month re-apprehension rate for male… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…11 Bazzi et al (2018) provide a nice summary on the risk of apprehension, with estimates of the probability of apprehension conditional on attempted return ranging from 40 to 60%. We assume that the unconditional probability is likely to be much smaller, since not all migrants will attempt return.…”
Section: Daca Incentives For Educationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11 Bazzi et al (2018) provide a nice summary on the risk of apprehension, with estimates of the probability of apprehension conditional on attempted return ranging from 40 to 60%. We assume that the unconditional probability is likely to be much smaller, since not all migrants will attempt return.…”
Section: Daca Incentives For Educationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But barriers were strengthened and surveillance intensified further, and from 2005 on, tougher sanctions were imposed that included criminal proceedings. Analysis of individual-level data on apprehensions for 2008-2012 indicates that this reduced the probability of re-apprehension within a year by nearly one-quarter (Bazzi et al 2018). With the subsequent transition from single Mexicans looking for work to Central American families seeking asylum, the United States faces new challenges at the border.…”
Section: What Drives Asylum Applications?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Penalties for illegal crossings have also increased, as has the ease with which penalties are meted out. So-called "zero tolerance" and "consequence" policies implemented by the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) increased the share of apprehended migrants subject to administrative and criminal sanctions from 15 percent in 2008 to 85 percent in 2012 (Bazzi et al 2018). Border enforcement deters migration by increasing not only the odds of being apprehended and the penalties if apprehended, but also the need to hire a smuggler to evade apprehension and the cost of doing so.…”
Section: Effects Of Border Enforcement On Immigration and Crimementioning
confidence: 99%