Developing a Decision-Making Model for Construction Safety Behavior Supervision: An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Analysis

Abstract

Without the active participation of enterprises and front-line workers, it is difficult for the government to perform effective supervision to ensure behavioral safety among front-line workers. To overcome inadequate government supervision and information attenuation caused by vertical management mode and limited resources, and to change passive supervision into active control with the proactive participation of enterprises and workers, this paper combines the entity responsibility mechanism and the third-party participation mechanism based on government supervision to analyze the decision-making process of government and enterprises on safety behavior supervision. An evolutionary game model was established to describe the decision-making interactions between the government and construction enterprises under the two mechanisms, and a simulation was performed to illustrate the factors influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. The results show that both mechanisms have a positive effect on government supervision, and the third-party participation mechanism was found to be working better. The implementation of the two mechanisms is influenced by punishment, subsidy, and cost, and it has different sensitivities to the three influencing factors. This study provides a theoretical framework for enhancing the government supervision mechanism, and the decision-making between the government and construction enterprises enhances the management form and guides their actual supervision practices.

Integrating coevolutionary strategies and risk preferences: a novel supervision insight for pollutant abatement

“…Evolutionary game theory has emerged as a prominent framework in recent years for studying pollutant abatement, offering a powerful tool to analyze the dynamics between regulators and enterprises (Xu et al, 2021;Gu et al, 2022;Ning et al, 2022). This paper aims to delve into the practical application of evolutionary game theory in the context of pollutant reduction, specifically examining how businesses evolve their cooperative strategies in the face of collective risks, with a particular focus on navigating the societal dilemma between economic interests and environmental protection.…”

Incentives for Promoting Safety in the Chinese Construction Industry

“…The study considers the incentive model between the owner and the contractor, proposes the safety incentive model between the government, the owner, and the contractor, and studies the influence of the incentive parameters of the two on the model. Contractors are the main bearers of the responsibility for safe production on site and are expected to take initiatives to fulfill their production-related responsibilities [12]. They can directly supervise the safety-related behaviors of front-line workers, and the government can participate in safe production and safety supervision along with contractors [13].…”