2021
DOI: 10.3390/ijerph18073594
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Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Abstract: The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system … Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Accidents in the construction industry have been a serious global issue for a long time; moreover, industrial safety is a matter of utmost significance ( Jin et al, 2020 ; Li Z. et al, 2021 ). The government, as an external constraint force, has been recognized as critical for construction safety ( Zeng and Chen, 2015 ), however, the statistics on industrial accident casualties indicate that there are still some defects in government supervision.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Accidents in the construction industry have been a serious global issue for a long time; moreover, industrial safety is a matter of utmost significance ( Jin et al, 2020 ; Li Z. et al, 2021 ). The government, as an external constraint force, has been recognized as critical for construction safety ( Zeng and Chen, 2015 ), however, the statistics on industrial accident casualties indicate that there are still some defects in government supervision.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The government, as an external constraint force, has been recognized as critical for construction safety ( Zeng and Chen, 2015 ), however, the statistics on industrial accident casualties indicate that there are still some defects in government supervision. On the one hand, a lack of personnel and resources results in inadequate government supervision ( Cao and Du, 2018 ; Gong et al, 2021 ). On the other hand, China’s safety supervision system adopts vertical management, which entails that government supervision of construction safety is unified management and hierarchical responsibility ( Ma and Zhao, 2018 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Due to the information asymmetry and the inconsistency of interest objectives among stakeholders, it is inevitable to occur rent-seeking behavior in project construction, making the project face many safety quality potentials (Wang et al, 2014). The interaction between the behaviors of project transaction participants is a mutual game process under bounded rationality and uncertainty, which belongs to a finite repeated game and meets the conditions of the evolutionary game (Liu et al, 2021;Gong et al, 2021). Therefore, more scholars have used evolutionary game theory to explore rent-seeking behaviors between project agents.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To prevent such accidents in advance, a study was conducted to reinforce the role of safety managers of suppliers with a high probability of accidents [17,18] and to explain the role of safety managers at each construction stage (client, designer, supervisor, and contractor) [19,20]. In addition, solutions incorporating state-of-the-art technologies have been proposed to mitigate against risk factors in construction projects.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%