2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2011.10.009
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Developing Responsive Rail Services through collaboration

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Cited by 24 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…The former consists of determining the optimal bidding price for a request (or for a bundle of requests), whereby the carrier's expected revenue is maximised (Agralı, Tan, and Karaesmen 2008;Dai, Chen, and Yang 2014;Kuyzu et al 2015;Gansterer and Hartl 2016;Qiao, Pan, and Ballot 2016). The latter consists of assigning many requests to many bidding carriers in an optimal way, usually solved using linear programming (Berger and Bierwirth 2010;Dai and Chen 2011;Kuo and Miller-Hooks 2012;Huang and Xu 2013;Xu and Huang 2013;Xu and Huang 2014;Chen 2016;Xu, Huang, and Cheng 2016;Lai, Cai, and Hu 2017). Moreover, auctions may have different mechanisms depending on the actual problem to be solved (see van Duin, Tavasszy, and Taniguchi (2007) and Verdonck et al (2013) for a comparison of the mechanisms).…”
Section: Mechanism For Exchanging Requests (I3)mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The former consists of determining the optimal bidding price for a request (or for a bundle of requests), whereby the carrier's expected revenue is maximised (Agralı, Tan, and Karaesmen 2008;Dai, Chen, and Yang 2014;Kuyzu et al 2015;Gansterer and Hartl 2016;Qiao, Pan, and Ballot 2016). The latter consists of assigning many requests to many bidding carriers in an optimal way, usually solved using linear programming (Berger and Bierwirth 2010;Dai and Chen 2011;Kuo and Miller-Hooks 2012;Huang and Xu 2013;Xu and Huang 2013;Xu and Huang 2014;Chen 2016;Xu, Huang, and Cheng 2016;Lai, Cai, and Hu 2017). Moreover, auctions may have different mechanisms depending on the actual problem to be solved (see van Duin, Tavasszy, and Taniguchi (2007) and Verdonck et al (2013) for a comparison of the mechanisms).…”
Section: Mechanism For Exchanging Requests (I3)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fourthly, not many studies focus on horizontal collaboration for intermodal transport, with only a few of the papers reviewed being devoted to this issue (see Puettmann and Stadtler 2010;Kuo and Miller-Hooks 2012;Pan, Ballot, and Fontane 2013;Sarraj et al 2014a). This line of research should be enhanced for the sake of sustainability in logistics.…”
Section: Further Research Prospectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, the booming growth of e-commerce promoted the radiating capacity of regional commodity markets improved greatly. The urban railway also developed rapidly, it constructed the most convenient transportation channel, strengthening urban functions, and promoting the urban development for the huge and mid-size cities (Kuo and Miller-Hooks 2012). Gradually, some new towns in the suburbs had higher agglomerations of activity than did those on the border of the central urban area.…”
Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, combinatorial auctions have been used to competitively assign freight paths among train operators (Harrod 2013) in a planning phase. Game theoretical studies, mostly of cooperative game theory, and transferable utility assumptions, to study this allocation, can be found, for instance, in Bablinski (2015) and Kuo and Miller Hooks (2012).…”
Section: Game Theoretical Studies In Transit Ormentioning
confidence: 99%