Development of a Cournot-oligopoly model for competition of multi-product supply chains under government supervision

Hafezalkotob, Ashkan; Borhani, S.; Zamani, S.

doi:10.24200/sci.2017.4132

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 40 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Matlab simulation technology is an effective computer simulation method for studying feedback behavior in complex systems [44][45][46][47][48][49]. In the above multiplayer game, the individuals constantly imitate and learn from other individuals by observing and comparing the payoffs with others and then adjust their strategy selection, which constitutes the feedback behavior in the group.…”

Section: Simulation Analysis Of the Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Zhang

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

show abstract

Section: Simulation Analysis Of the Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Zhang

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…From Equations (19) and (20), whether the company adopts green mining or not, the local government's inclination to supervise is always positively correlated with the annual ore output Q R and cost of treating the unit area contaminated land F t , and is negatively correlated with supervision cost C. If the local government's supervision cost is low and F t is expensive, it will tend to supervise the mining company.…”

Section: When the Company Does Not Adopt Green Miningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since consistent supervision could damage the company's reputation, large mines would prefer reduction in the local government's inclination to supervise them. From Equations (19) and (20), companies can reduce the local government's inclination to supervise only by adopting green mining. When a large mining company improves its green mining technology level, the comprehensive utilization rate of TWR, R, will increase; the area of land polluted, p g , and amount of waste rocks, ω g , will be reduced; consequently, the local government's increased profit of supervision, ∆U g , will be reduced.…”

Section: When the Company Does Not Adopt Green Miningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhao et al [18,19] used game theory to assess the government and manufacturers' strategies for reducing environmental risk of materials and promote more environmentally friendly products. Hafezalkotob et al [20,21] established the production competition models of green and non-green supply chains considering the intervention schemas of governments. Scholars also analysed the impact of a government's punishment or subsidy policies on enterprises' strategies for reducing the environmental risks [22,23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What Hinders the Promotion of the Green Mining Mode in China? A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Local Government and Metal Mining Companies

Zhao

Zhou

et al. 2020

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

China is currently trying to reduce the environmental impact of metal mining operations by promoting green mining. However, conflicts of interest between the central government, local governments, and metal mining companies often negatively affect the implementation of related policies. This paper conducted a theoretical analysis of the game mechanism between local governments and metal mining companies to study the factors that influence their strategies. First, we summarize the various game model parameters, determine the strategies which the companies and local government can choose, and establish the game model for the companies and the local government. Second, we list the utility of the company and local government under all game outcomes and analyse their behavioral tendencies. Third, we discuss the impacts of various factors on the choice of their mining mode in detail. The behavioral analysis shows that the local government’s inclination to supervise a mine is negatively related to the supervision cost and positively related to the production scale of this mine; various factors influence the companies in their decision making, with the yield and comprehensive utilization rate of tailings and waste rocks have the greatest impact; the scale of mine production also affects the companies’ willingness to carry out technological innovation. Finally, we offer some suggestions for the promotion of green mining.

show abstract

“…Hafezalkotob et al [26] formulated a competitive model in multi-product green supply chains under government supervision to reduce the environmental pollution cost. They provided a novel approach to construct a model that maximized the government tari s and pro ts of the suppliers and manufacturers in all the green supply chains.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing in Two Competing Supply Chains Based on Market Power and Market Size under Centralized and Decentralized Structures

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study considered the competition between two multi-echelon supply chains with identical structures on price under two market power structures. For this purpose, two di erent scenarios were developed. In the rst scenario, both supply chains decided simultaneously (the Nash game). In the second scenario, due to the imbalance of power between the two supply chains, the Stackelberg game was adopted in the model. The paper investigated the e ects of di erent relations between the market sizes of supply chains and the supply chain structures on price and pro t along with the analysis of power in the market. Based on these assumptions, it was found that the supply chains did not always involve the second-mover advantage in the price Stackelberg game. Furthermore, having the centralized structure, both of the supply chains bene ted from the presence of a leader in the market for di erent combinations of market size. Moreover, the relationship between price and pro t was analyzed given the size of the market in di erent scenarios rather than through provision of numerical examples.

show abstract

Development of a Cournot-oligopoly model for competition of multi-product supply chains under government supervision

Cited by 7 publications

References 40 publications

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

What Hinders the Promotion of the Green Mining Mode in China? A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Local Government and Metal Mining Companies

Pricing in Two Competing Supply Chains Based on Market Power and Market Size under Centralized and Decentralized Structures

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About