Development of Array Receivers with Anti-Jamming and Anti-Spoofing Capabilities with Help of Multi-Antenna GNSS Signal Simulators

Konovaltsev, Andriy; Marcos, Emilio Perez; Cuntz, Manuel; Meurer, Michael; Wong, Ronald; Buesnel, Guy; Lange, W

doi:10.33012/2019.16988

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Spread spectrum security code (e.g., [32]) System Navigation message authentication (e.g., [32,33]) L1/L2 power level comparison (e.g., [34,35]) L1/L2 power level code phase comparison (e.g., [34]) Hardware DOA monitoring (e.g., [36,37]) Synthetic antenna array (e.g., [38]) Signal strength monitoring (e.g., [17,39]) Doppler monitoring (e.g., [40,41]) Code and phase rates consistency check (e.g., [34]) TOA monitoring (e.g., [17,42]) PRN code and data bit latency (e.g., [43][44][45]) Auxiliary peak tracking APT (e.g., [18]) Signal quality monitoring (e.g., [46][47][48]) Firmware Distribution analysis of correlator output (e.g., [49,50]) C/N 0 Monitoring (CNM) (e.g., [34,39]) Physical Cross-Check (PCC) (e.g., [51][52][53][54]) Clock Drift Monitoring (CDM) (e.g., [8,18]) Ephemeris Data Validation (EDV) (e.g., [34,55]) Software Pairwise Distance Monitoring (PDM) (e.g., [7,56]) Notation: Effective ( ), semi-effective ( ), and ineffective ( ) GPS spoofing detection regarding individual attacker models defined in Section 3.2, cf. Figure 2.…”

Section: Spoofing Countermeasure Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Spravil

Hemminghaus

Rechenberg

et al. 2023

JMSE

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Today’s maritime transportation relies on global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) for accurate navigation. The high-precision GNSS receivers on board modern vessels are often considered trustworthy. However, due to technological advances and malicious activities, this assumption is no longer always true. Numerous incidents of tampered GNSS signals have been reported. Furthermore, researchers have demonstrated that manipulations can be carried out even with inexpensive hardware and little expert knowledge, lowering the barrier for malicious attacks with far-reaching consequences. Hence, exclusive trust in GNSS is misplaced, and methods for reliable detection are urgently needed. However, many of the proposed solutions require expensive replacement of existing hardware. In this paper, therefore, we present MAritime Nmea-based Anomaly detection (MANA), a novel low-cost framework for GPS spoofing detection. MANA monitors NMEA-0183 data and advantageously combines several software-based methods. Using simulations supported by real-world experiments that generate an extensive dataset, we investigate our approach and finally evaluate its effectiveness.

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Section: Spoofing Countermeasure Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Spravil

Hemminghaus

Rechenberg

et al. 2023

JMSE

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“…A hardware emulation was performed to examine the proposed method in a more sophisticated environment at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) multi-output advanced signal test environment for receivers (MASTER). This facility has several GSS9000 series Spirent GNSS constellation simulators (Konovaltsev et al, 2019) which have been used to generate authentic GNSS signals of a full GPS constellation in real time and to broadcast the legacy C/A code and the new L1C signals. The signals were then digitized and stored for subsequent offline processing, as illustrated in Figure 2(b).…”

Section: Hardware Emulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development and Validation of a Multipath Mitigation Technique Using Multi-Correlator Structures

Siebert

Konovaltsev

Meurer

2023

navi

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are critical for a variety of applications, including surveying, time synchronization of mobile telecommunication networks, and power grids. The use of GNSSs in aeronautics, maritime, and automobile navigation has been expanding. This technology is also critical for the navigation of autonomous vehicles. Current GNSSs already provide reliable and precise positioning under routine conditions. However, conventional GNSS receivers are vulnerable to multipath propagation that can degrade their performance or even lead to failure. As a result, the use of GNSS technology in safety-critical applications (e.g., autonomous cars or unmanned aerial vehicles) remains challenging and requires additional countermeasures.Multipath propagation is the term used to describe a radio channel in which a signal reaches the user via more than one path. This can lead to the superposition of a direct line-of-sight (LOS) satellite signal and multiple delayed replicas of itself at the receiver. Under these circumstances, the correlation of the received signal with the local replica recorded by the GNSS receiver will lead to distorted results. A conventional delay locked loop (DLL) cannot handle these types of signals and

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“…Recently, the detection of angle of arrival (AoA) of signal is a robust and effective technique to not only detect but also mitigate the counterfeit signals. This defense exploits the fact that authentic GNSS signals come from different directions (signals are transmitted by satellites in orbit from separated directions) whereas counterfeit signals are likely to be transmitted from a single direction (the antenna of the spoofer) [10,11]. The AoA of the signal can be extracted by special processing using two or more antennas at the receiver side.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A method to build feature descriptor for GNSS spoofing detection by carrier phase double difference measurement

Dinh,

Huu,

Van

et al. 2024

Meas. Sci. Technol.

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GNSS spoofing is a type of attack that aims to deceive GNSS receivers by transmitting fake signals that imitate the authentic ones. To detect such attacks, a possible solution is to calculate the double difference (DD) of carrier phase measurements between two antennas of two separated receivers. This DD measurement represents the angle of arrival (AoA) information of the signal. In the case of authentic signals, each signal comes from a different satellite, so the AoA values are different for each satellite. However, in the case of a spoofing attack, all the counterfeit signals from the same broadcaster come from the same direction, and thus the AoA values are the same for all DD measurements. Sum of Squares (SoS) detector and Dispersion of Double Difference (D3) detector are known as simple but effective methods for spoofing detection. However, these detectors are not robust in some special regions where cycle slips are large and vary rapidly. This paper proposes a new method for detecting GNSS spoofing by using carrier phase double difference measurements to generate a feature vector as a descriptor for each satellite in a set of observed satellites. The feature vectors are formed by statistical parameters of a series of consecutive double difference values computed for each reference satellite. Our proposed feature descriptor has been evaluated on a dataset containing both real and fake signals using an SVM classifier. The study shows that the proposed feature descriptor is highly effective in detecting spoofing satellite signals.

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Development of Array Receivers with Anti-Jamming and Anti-Spoofing Capabilities with Help of Multi-Antenna GNSS Signal Simulators

Cited by 5 publications

References 2 publications

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Detecting Maritime GPS Spoofing Attacks Based on NMEA Sentence Integrity Monitoring

Development and Validation of a Multipath Mitigation Technique Using Multi-Correlator Structures

A method to build feature descriptor for GNSS spoofing detection by carrier phase double difference measurement

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