Development of temporal patterning and vocal hesitations in spontaneous narratives

Kowal, Sabine; O’Connell, Daniel C.; Sabin, Edward J.

doi:10.1007/bf01066926

Cited by 135 publications

(85 citation statements)

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“…This finding held when rate was measured in either syllables per second or phones per second. Analysis by Flipsen also indicated that the rate values obtained at initial and follow-up testing overall were consistent with findings from cross-sectional studies of typically developing children when measured in syllables per second (Amster, 1984;Hall, Amir, & Yairi, 1999;Haselager, Slis, & Rietveld, 1991;Kowal, O'Connell, & Sabin, 1975;Pindzola, Jenkins, & Lokken, 1989;Walker, Archibald, Cherniak, & Fish, 1992). Relative to the phones per second measure, comparisons for the initial testing data indicated slower articulation rates being produced by the current study participants; no direct comparisons were possible for the follow-up data.…”

Section: Articulation Rate and Normalization Failuresupporting

confidence: 61%

Articulation Rate and Speech-Sound Normalization Failure

Flipsen

2003

J Speech Lang Hear Res

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Not all children with speech delay (SD) of unknown origin develop fully normal speech even with intervention. Many retain residual distortion errors into adolescence and ultimately into adulthood. The current study examined whether articulation rate distinguishes those children who retain residual errors from those who normalize. Two groups of speech-delayed children originally identified at preschool age were retested at age 9 years (the early follow-up group) and at age 12–16 years (the late follow-up group), respectively. No differences in articulation rate were observed at either test time in conversational speech between those children who continued to produce residual distortion errors (RE) compared to those children who had fully normalized speech (NSA). For the late follow-up group, children in the RE outcome group articulated speech at significantly slower rates than the children in the NSA outcome group in an embedded words task using both syllables per second and phones per second measures. Findings suggested that children with SD of unknown origin who fail to normalize may have relative speech-motor deficits and possibly deficits in language formulation skill. Alternatively, slower articulation rate in structured tasks may represent some sort of compensation for the continuing presence of speech-sound errors. Possible motivations for such compensation are discussed.

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Section: Articulation Rate and Normalization Failuresupporting

confidence: 61%

Articulation Rate and Speech-Sound Normalization Failure

Flipsen

2003

J Speech Lang Hear Res

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“…On the basis of the relevant literature (cf. Kowal et al 1975;Gocsál 2001 for Hungarian), we had thought that girls should talk faster. The data did not verify our hypothesis, because we could not prove a straightforward tendency based on our findings.…”

Section: ì ð ¿mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several researchers have dealt with temporal patterning in the speech of monolingual children (e.g., for English: Boutsen-Hood 1997;Hall-Yairi 1997;Kowal et al 1975;Tingley-Allen 1975;Walker et al 1993;for Hungarian: Fó-nagy-Magdics 1960;Gósy 1991a;Laczkó 1991). The majority of these present a cross-section analysis.…”

Section: ö ×þø ò ñ òý öømentioning

confidence: 99%

The temporal organisation of speech in monolingual and bilingual children

Menyhárt¹

2002

Acta Linguistica Hungarica

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Research on the temporal organisation of speech with respect to age is extremely important as it may provide empirical confirmation for the various models of speech production. With the advancement of age, speech motor control becomes more secure, and so the child gradually approaches the level of articulation and speech tempo typical of adults. There have been numerous works published on the temporal relations of English-speaking, normally developing children; however, the relevant literature still lacks data on bilingual children. The present paper aims to fill this gap: it discusses the temporal organisation of speech in HungarianBulgarian bilingual children between the ages of 9 and 13 and monolingual children of the same age in a developmental perspective. The data on monolingual children in this paper also break new ground as only few papers have dealt with the speech rate of Hungarian children and none with that of Bulgarian children. ½º ÁÒØÖÓ Ù Ø ÓÒIn the process of acquiring language, the child learns to understand and produce the speech sounds, sound sequences, words, and syntactic structures of his language from which he constructs sentences and coherent utterances. As the child ages, his linguistic competence also improves, and as years go by, he becomes a skilled speaker-listener. By the age of three, the normally developing child is capable of correctly producing most speech sounds, talks a lot and does it with pleasure, and he frequently uses complicated syntactic structures (Downing-Valtin 1984). By the age of six, he has built a considerable vocabulary, and he develops the kind of language awareness that enables him to acquire written language, too. We can observe a high level of language awareness in 8-10-year-old children; in most cases, this is the age when foreign language teaching also begins. Although it is very similar to that of adults, the speech of 10-14-year-olds may show significant differences, typical of this age (for example, in the area of temporal relations), and so it may well be justified to refer to it as "teenage language" (Gósy 1999).

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“…A similar time window in the motor domain has been observed in studies on the duration of intentional movements (Schleidt et al 1987). Speech appears to be segmented in a similar temporal fashion (e.g., Kowal et al 1975;Vollrath et al 1992), that is, movement and speech patterns are preferentially implemented in 3-second windows. Other examples come from the perceptual domain (e.g., Gerstner & Fazio 1995;.…”

Section: Ernst Pöppelmentioning

confidence: 99%

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

Gamble¹

1997

Behav Brain Sci

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of the original article: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses."Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct "guesses." They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness. An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?Joseph E. BogenDepartment of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033-4620.Abstract: Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a "zombie," computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?Block (1995a) makes a clear conceptual distinction between what he calls phenomenal consciousness (P) and what he calls access consciousness (A). The former (P) he points to by saying that "P-conscious states are experiential"; he gives examples such as smells, tastes, pains, thoughts, and desires (p. 230). The latter (A) he describes as a state in which some content is "poised for use as a premise in reasoning" and "poised for rational control of action" (p. 231). A can also be "poised for rational control of speech," but for Block this is not a necessary aspect because he considers chimps to have A. Indeed, he elsewhere notes that "very much lower animals are A-conscious" (p. 238). Block is at some pains to consider the possibilities of P without A and of A without P; in particular, he says, "It certainly seems conceptually possible that the neural bases of P-consciousness systems and A-consciousness systems are distinct" (p. 233). Block provides some possible examples of P without A (on p. 234 and p. 244) such as "becoming conscious" (acquiring A) of an ongoing noise (e.g., a pneumatic drill) some considerable time after one has been "aware of " or has been "experiencing" it. Although Block is reluctant to accept dreaming as an example of P without A (p. 275), some of us are inclined to a...

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Development of temporal patterning and vocal hesitations in spontaneous narratives

Cited by 135 publications

References 14 publications

Articulation Rate and Speech-Sound Normalization Failure

Articulation Rate and Speech-Sound Normalization Failure

The temporal organisation of speech in monolingual and bilingual children

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

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