Devolution and EU policy-shaping: bridging the gap between multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism

Abstract

This paper argues that the impact of devolution has been largely misperceived in both liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) accounts of European Union (EU) politics. To address the shortcomings of both LI and MLG, a new data set measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process in the EU-27 is presented. Analysis shows that the relationship between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is overall positive but non-linear, with a strong threshold effect that is best captured by a quadratic function. The causal nature of the link between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is ascertained through qualitative means using process tracing and Mill’s method of difference. The article concludes with the necessary updating of MLG and LI frameworks to account for the impact of devolution on EU policy-shaping.

Support from below? Supranational institutions, regional élites and governance preferences

“…Regional actors have no default bias towards the Commission. If central government or other institutions can be allies in the policy game, they will not seek solace elsewhere, be it in terms of direct interest representation in Brussels (Ansell et al 1997;Tatham 2010), lobbying for constitutional change at the EU level (Bauer 2006;Jeffery 2007) or governance preferences towards the Commission (this paper). The second concerns perceived country benefits.…”

“…These regional authorities have been increasingly active at the European level as the overlap between EU and regional competences has steadily grown (John 2000). Not only do they lobby directly at the supranational level (Tatham 2008), they also lobby their own member state, and in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom (devolved governments), Finland (Å land) or Portugal (Azores and Madeira), they can exert much formal and informal leverage on their member state's EU position (Jeffery 2000(Jeffery , 2007Tatham 2011). Additionally, these territorial governments are heavily involved at the postlegislative phase of the policy cycle.…”

Multilevel Governance and the State

“…However, subnational actors merely implement EU policy in centralized countries. In federations and countries with a strong regional tier, EU integration has generally led to more cooperation, rather than competition, between regions and central government (Tatham 2011). The Committee of the Regions, a consultative assembly of subnational leaders across the EU, has issued a Charter for Multilevel Governance that sets out principles and methods for involving regions in national and European decision-making.…”

Coping with power dispersion? Autonomy, co-ordination and control in multilevel systems

“…They have also done so by accepting policy differentiation despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing uniformity (Jeffery et al 2014). Furthermore, they have included some of their regions in the co-determination of national and supranational policies (Tatham 2011), hence contributing to ring-fencing regional competences from EU encroachment (Tatham and Bauer 2014). Finally, they have diffused non-binding modes of co-ordination to reconcile functional pressures with the desire to avoid 'hard' integration (Maggetti and Gilardi 2014).…”