Devolution and the Limits of Tory Statecraft: The Conservative Party in Coalition and Scotland and Wales

Abstract

This article examines the territorial statecraft of the Conservative Party both internally and in the coalition government since 2010. Using Bulpitt's statecraft framework alongside some more recent work on UK intergovernmental relations, it argues that the Conservative Party has pursued broadly the same strategy as the previous Labour administration: centre autonomy management. Thus, as long as the devolved administrations and Welsh and Scottish Conservatives stick to their low politics remit, territorial policy divergence and autonomy remain mostly irrelevant to the centre. In terms of intergovernmental relations, the Conservatives have handled territorial politics in coalition reasonably well. However, the recent Scotland Act and the Commission on Welsh Devolution point towards a future of sharing Treasury control over UK public finances. With the centre's governing autonomy increasingly compromised, the Conservative Party faces the challenge of creating a new strategy which allows it to pursue its priorities.

Territory, power and statecraft: understanding English devolution

“…British territorial management was therefore a history of continuity rather than change based around a 'dual polity' whereby the national government preferred to concentrate on 'high politics'. Analyses of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland through a Bulpittian framework have concluded that the central autonomy model remains dominant there despite the strength of devolved powers (Bradbury, 2006;Convery, 2014). Our Bulpittian analysis continues in this historical and qualitative vein to look at the political imperatives shaping the most recent chapter in English territorial governance.…”

Nationalism, party political discourse and Scottish independence: comparing discursive visions of Scotland's constitutional status

“…This emphasis on the Conservatives' historic contribution, in conjunction with the additional devolution of powers proposed by the party in the Strathclyde Commission (Scottish Conservatives, ), lends support to the arguments of Leith and Soule () concerning the Conservatives' recent conversion to support for Scottish devolution. Given the party's opposition to the introduction of the Scottish Parliament in the 1997 referendum, this stark contrast in its discourse demonstrates that there has been a move towards ‘unionist nationalism’ in the party's narratives on constitutional policy (Convery ; Ichijo ; Steven et al ). Indeed, analysis of the details of the Strathclyde Commission's proposals demonstrated a greater willingness to devolve fiscal and budgetary powers to Holyrood than Labour's Devolution Commission proposals (Thomson et al ), illustrating a swing in the party's adherence to ‘small “n” nationalism’ (Leith and Soule ) which outstrips that of Labour.…”

“…This illustrates that the referendum campaign remained an opportunity for the articulation of contrasting political arguments by parties which were otherwise cooperating on constitutional matters, with the Conservatives' discourse articulating the party's Euro‐sceptic and Euro‐reformer ‘values’ in order to differentiate it from both the SNP and Labour (Anderson ; Convery ). However, these sceptical positions towards the European Union in turn highlight an ideological paradox within the Conservative's discourse, given their ideological objections to the arguments of Scottish political nationalists regarding the need for Scottish political sovereignty, whilst simultaneously making similar arguments regarding the need for enhanced British sovereignty following the loss of power to the European Union.…”

“…Ironically, the Conservatives also highlighted the danger of losing membership of the EU as another risk factor for an independent Scotland, despite the party's own Euro‐sceptic or Euro‐reformer ideological ‘values’ (Anderson ; Convery ). However, given the arguments of Ichijo () about the comparatively favourable views on EU membership held by the Scottish electorate, it can again be argued that the mention of this issue by the Conservatives resembles a pragmatic political calculation to achieve the party's ultimate ‘goal’ of a ‘No’ vote.…”

Evaluating British prime ministerial performance: David Cameron’s premiership in political time

“…Despite initial success in minimising centre-periphery conflict (Convery, 2014), the Union became significantly more vulnerable by 2015. In the absence of a counter-factual, it is impossible to assess whether denying the SNP a two-question referendum and agreeing to a 2-year timescale for the referendum was a strategic error.…”