Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities

Haji, Ishtiyaque; McKenna, Michael

doi:10.5840/jphil2004101616

Cited by 36 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…For a brief summary see (McKenna and Widerker, 2003, pp. 9-10), and for recent contributions to the debate, see (Palmer, 2005;Haji and McKenna, 2004;Ginet, 2003;Hunt, 2003;Kane, 2003;McKenna, 2003;Mele and Robb, 2003;Pereboom, 2003;Stump, 2003;Widerker, 2003). coercion would be registered in Jones 4 's decision as the bare decision to A, because the circumstances that make the action unavoidable are the same as those that bring it about that Jones 4 acts as he does.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Harry Frankfurt argued that alternative possibilities aren't required for moral responsibility and in doing so he stimulated an enormous debate about the role of alternative possibilities for freedom, agency and moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 1969). 1 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have provided the most developed elaboration of Frankfurt's core argument in terms of their model of 'guidance control', yet they argue that the agent 'chooses freely' in the actual 1 For recent contributions and extensive bibliographies to what is now a literature too large to reference fully here, see essays in (Widerker and McKenna, 2003;Kane, 2002;Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000); Journal of Ethics 3 (1999), Number 4); also (Palmer, 2005;Haji and McKenna, 2004;Fischer, 1999). sequence (in the presence of a passive counterfactual intervener) and they emphasise the importance of 'choice' in their account of moral responsibility in a causally determined world (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998;Fischer, 2004). 2 In spite of the importance of the notion of choice, however, the part that it plays in the Frankfurt -Fischer/Ravizza version of compatibilism has been little explored by philosophers.…”

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confidence: 97%

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Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Brown

2006

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed -a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement -provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's 'decision to act' involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.

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Section: IImentioning

confidence: 94%

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confidence: 97%

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Brown

2006

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…24 A more cautious manner of arguing would be to assume only that it is not demonstrated that the agent is not morally responsible. See, for e.g., Fischer (1999) and Haji (2004) and McKenna (2006). For present purposes, though, we can work with the stronger assumption.…”

Section: Some Thoughts On Frankfurt Examplesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Haji¹

2012

J Ethics

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This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the ''luck objection'' to a popular libertarian account of the control that responsibility requires. This is, roughly, the objection that when our decisions are indeterministically caused, their occurrence is a matter of responsibility-undermining luck. Finally, I comment on Frankfurt examples.

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“…In previous work, Fischer (1999 and2002) has challenged the assumption that deterministic Frankfurt cases necessarily beg the question against the incompatibilist (see also Haji and McKenna 2004). His basic insight is this: to refute PAP, Frankfurt needs to show not that Jones is morally responsible for his action despite lacking alternatives, but rather that the issue of whether he had alternatives is irrelevant to his responsibility.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…I am not convinced, therefore, that Fischer has shown there to be a sound response to the Dilemma Defence on the deterministic horn of the dilemma. Yet Fischer also indicates a backup position (2012: 42-7; see also Haji and McKenna 2004). This is that, even if deterministic versions of the Frankfurt cases turn out to beg the question against the committed incompatibilist, they need not do so against the 'floating voter' not yet persuaded by either party to the debate.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fischer-style Compatibilism

Garnett

2013

Analysis

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(Oxford University Press, 2012), constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibility (Fischer 1994, 2006, Fischer and Ravizza 1998.Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners. It is, however, essential reading for specialists, as well as useful reading for nonspecialists seeking a snapshot of the current state of the debate.Fischer's papers are dense with argument and alive with original and productive ideas.As is customary, however, I here focus only on lines of thought that failed to convince. In particular, I discus two arguments: one aimed at vindicating Frankfurt-style counterexamples in deterministic contexts, and one aimed at undermining the 'source' incompatibilist's conception of moral responsibility.

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Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities

Cited by 36 publications

References 0 publications

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

Fischer-style Compatibilism

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