We analyze the impact of CDS trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the e ect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risksharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower's debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.Keywords: Loan Sales, Credit Default Swaps, Syndicate Structure, Syndicated Loans
JEL-Classification: G21, G32ú Daniel Streitz is from the Institute of Corporate Finance at Humboldt University Berlin. The author would like to thank Tim Adam, Tobias Berg, Valentin Burg, Sudipto Dasgupta, Hermann Elendner, Xavier Giroud, Laurenz Klipper, Augustin Landier, Christian Laux, Gustavo Manso, Martin Oehmke, Steven Ongena (the editor), Gordon Phillips, Tobias Scheinert, Sascha Ste en, Alex Stomper, Gunter Strobl, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Some of the work on this paper was completed while the author was visiting USC Marshall School of Business. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 649 "Economic Risk" and SFB-TR15 "Governance and the E ciency of Economic Systems". Send correspondence to Daniel Streitz, Institute of Corporate Finance, Dorotheenstrasse 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany; E-mail: daniel.streitz@wiwi.hu-berlin.de.
The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndicationú February 2, 2015
AbstractWe analyze the impact of CDS trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the e ect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risksharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower's debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.