Differences in Perceived Color as a Function of Characteristic Color

Delk, John R.; Fillenbaum, Samuel

doi:10.2307/1420503

Cited by 131 publications

(88 citation statements)

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“…Thus, the finding of Duncker (1939), Bruner et al (1951), and Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) that the expected color of objects affects how they are perceived challenges Pylyshyn's thesis.…”

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…However, a third study by Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) revisited Duncker's paradigm and demonstrated that it is possible to vary the perceived color of a shape. Fortuitously, Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) placed their color wheel directly behind the shape being examined.…”

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fortuitously, Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) placed their color wheel directly behind the shape being examined. The shape could be either (1) a heart, apple, or pair of lips (all typically red), (2) an oval, circle, or ellipse (all typically neutral), or (3) a bell, mushroom, or a horse's head (all typically not red).…”

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This suggests a direct influence of the past experience of color memory on current precepts. Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) have demonstrated that the cognitive categorization of shapes changes one's assumptions about their color, which resides in early vision. People can place a visual stimulus in a number of distinct categories.…”

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability

Withagen¹,

Michaels²

1999

Behav Brain Sci

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We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.

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“…Thus, the finding of Duncker (1939), Bruner et al (1951), and Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) that the expected color of objects affects how they are perceived challenges Pylyshyn's thesis.…”

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Color Memory Penetrates Early Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability

Withagen¹,

Michaels²

1999

Behav Brain Sci

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“…One apparently fruitful approach to specifying how early an influence conceptual factors have is to identify influences on other processes. Thus, there is evidence that conceptual factors (knowledge of categories and attitudes) not only influence physical and immediate color judgments (Delk & Fillenbaum 1965;Goldstone 1995) but also exert an influence before the perceptual stage that creates color afterimages has completed its processing (Moscovici & Personnaz 1991). Similarly, there is evidence that conceptual factors related to one's knowledge of object categories exert an influence before the processing stage that produces figure-ground segregation (Peterson & Gibson 1994).…”

Section: Functions Perceptions and Their Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real-world categories don't allow uniform feature spaces – not just across categories but within categories also

Hahn¹,

Chater²

1998

Behav Brain Sci

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According to one productive and influential approach to cognition, categorization, object recognition, and higher level cognitive processes operate on a set of fixed features, which are the output of lower level perceptual processes. In many situations, however, it is the higher level cognitive process being executed that influences the lower level features that are created. Rather than viewing the repertoire of features as being fixed by low-level processes, we present a theory in which people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects. Two types of category learning should be distinguished. Fixed space category learning occurs when new categorizations are representable with the available feature set. Flexible space category learning occurs when new categorizations cannot be represented with the features available. Whether fixed or flexible, learning depends on the featural contrasts and similarities between the new category to be represented and the individual's existing concepts. Fixed feature approaches face one of two problems with tasks that call for new features: If the fixed features are fairly high level and directly useful for categorization, then they will not be flexible enough to represent all objects that might be relevant for a new task. If the fixed features are small, subsymbolic fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at the level of the functional features required to accomplish categorizations will not be captured by these primitives. We present evidence of flexible perceptual changes arising from category learning and theoretical arguments for the importance of this flexibility. We describe conditions that promote feature creation and argue against interpreting them in terms of fixed features. Finally, we discuss the implications of functional features for object categorization, conceptual development, chunking, constructive induction, and formal models of dimensionality reduction.

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