Different Dominant Models and Fairness Concern of E‐Supply Chain

Abstract

In this study, we examine the impact of the dominant enterprise’s fairness concern on decisions in e-supply chains. Considering that the network platform’s service level obviously influences product sales, an e-supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single network platform is constructed. In this setting, four models of whether fairness concern is considered by the different dominant parties are investigated, and optimal decisions of the four models are compared and analyzed to study the impact of fairness concern. The findings show that when fairness concern is not taken into account, the profits when enterprises are dominating system are higher than when they are not dominating system. When fairness concern is considered, the dominant enterprise’s fairness concern is beneficial to increase the subordinate enterprise’s profit, but it will reduce its profit. And when the network platform dominates system and considers fairness concern, the sales price and the service level are the highest, indicating that consumers can get an enjoyable shopping experience. To sales price, it is negatively correlated with the fairness concern coefficient if manufacturer dominates the system, while it is positively correlated with the fairness concern coefficient if network platform dominates the system. Regardless of who has the fairness concern, fairness concern can improve the service level and increase consumer stickiness.

A Product Service Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model considering Capacity Constraints

“…However, as far as we know, these studies only consider the coordination of a single supply chain. Although Wang [7] considers competition between product and service supply chains, the study only involves the analysis and proof of two chains. As we all know, the operation of each supply chain is not completely independent, and the cooperation between enterprises is largely affected by their own enterprise decision preferences and other enterprise decision-making behaviors.…”

How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference

“…Second, prior research does not consider altruistic preference and logistics constraints simultaneously in the platform decisionmaking models under different power structures. Our study fills this gap and extends this literature stream (e.g., [23,[25][26][27]) by adding both factors into a new subsidy decision model of a platform and quantifying the impact of power structure on the decision-making of platforms. Finally, the research on game models between platforms and retailers focuses on logistics services but rarely considers logistics constraints.…”

“…On the other hand, the scenario where platforms act as marketplaces by allowing upriver manufacturers to run their own online stores on platforms and sell products directly to consumers are investigated. Considering the service decision of e-commerce platform, Wang et al [25] investigate the pricing and service behavior of e-commerce supply chain participants under different power structures with fairness concern. In the case of introducing two manufacturers who sell substitutable products, Wei et al [23] depict the principle to choose the best sales formats, that is, resellers or marketplaces model for online platforms with different power structures.…”

Decisions of E-Commerce Supply Chain under Consumer Returns and Different Power Structures

“…However, in previous literature, they do not regard the independent e-platform as a decision-making subject, much less consider the channel power struggle between e-platforms and manufacturers. More relevant to this study, Wang et al [27] and Liu and Ke [57] researched the impact of power structures between manufacturers and e-platforms on product pricing, but neither of them considered the serious consumer returns in ESC. e third stream is the coordination mechanism in supply chains.…”

“…In addition, manufacturers introducing online direct sales channels will face competition from e-platforms for channel power. Unlike dual-channel supply chains where manufacturers set up online sales channels, in ESC, both manufacturers and e-platforms have channel power [27]. Nowadays, the power of e-platforms is growing, and the phenomenon of the transfer of the dominant power from manufacturers to e-platforms has emerged in ESC.…”