Differential Fault Analysis on the Families of SIMON and SPECK Ciphers

Tupsamudre, Harshal; Bisht, Shikha; Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep

doi:10.1109/fdtc.2014.14

Cited by 57 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In Shi, Danping, et al [5], research on linear(hull) cryptanalysis of SIMON block cipher round-reduced version by using linear characteristic on round function of SIMON block cipher and considered the dependence of S-boxes in the evaluation. There is a differential fault analysis on SIMON and SPECK ciphers [6], they assumed a bit-flip fault model and recover on n-bit round key of SIMON cipher using n/2 bit faults. On sidechannel perspective, research on side-channel perspective of SIMON block cipher FPGA implementations [7], they retrieve the secret key from the FPGA implementations.…”

Section: Simon and Speck Recent Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parallel Implementations of SIMON and SPECK

Park

Seo

Kim

2016

2016 International Conference on Platform Technology and Service (PlatCon)

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In these day, demands of light-weight block cipher algorithm which can support various platform, architecture and block/key size efficiently have been increasing. The N.S.A (National Security Agency) proposed SIMON and SPECK block ciphers in 2013. SIMON and SPECK support various block size such as 16, 32, 64-bit and key size such as 64, 96, 128, and so on. There are also a lot of researches on implementation of SIMON and SPECK block cipher on various platform and architecture such as on ASIC, AVR(8-bit), MSP430(16-bit), ARM(32-bit), and Intel core. We propose efficient ARM-NEON implementation, optimization methods and implementation results of SIMON and SPECK block cipher by using ARM-NEON SIMD techniques. With these methods, we enhance performance of SIMON and SPECK by 30.3 and 68.9%, compared to previous results respectively

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Section: Simon and Speck Recent Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parallel Implementations of SIMON and SPECK

Park

Seo

Kim

2016

2016 International Conference on Platform Technology and Service (PlatCon)

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“…For instance, the attacker prefers to inject faults at the last few rounds of AES [5,8]. Another example, if the attacker targets the left half input of the penultimate round in SIMON, the key can be retrieved from the last round [16].…”

Section: A Random Fault Injection Versus Fault Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strengthening SIMON Implementation Against Intelligent Fault Attacks

Dofe

Frey

Pahlevanzadeh

et al. 2015

IEEE Embedded Syst. Lett.

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Driven by malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus compromise the cryptosystem through fault attacks. Existing fault-detection methods can effectively detect random faults in the cipher implementation, but yield a high fault bypass rate (FBR) under intelligent fault attacks. To address this limitation, we propose a new microarchitecture to thwart fault attacks that place mathematically symmetric faults on the two encryption data paths. To further reduce the FBR for a new lightweight cipher SIMON, we propose a new countermeasure that integrates operand permutation and masking techniques. Closed-form expressions for de-permutation and de-masking in SIMON are provided in this letter. Our method was assessed under two fault attack scenarios (random and symmetric fault injections) with bit-flip, stuck-at-0, and stuck-at-1 fault models. Simulation results show that our method minimizes the FBR to zero with the fault attack scenarios of symmetric fault location and stuck-at-0 fault injections. Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault attack conditions, at the cost of 5% more area overhead than the most hardware-efficient fault detection method. Index Terms-Block cipher, cryptography, fault attacks, fault bypass rate, fault detection, security, SIMON.

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“…From the attack methodology point of view, the closest attack proposal to this paper is the attak proposed by Tupsamudre et al [9], aiming at SPECK cipher. Since SPECK uses the ARX structure as well, authors aimed at the only non-linear operation, at the modular addition.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the first publication proposing a fault analysis as a method to retrieve the secret information from the encryption process proposed by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton in 1997 [3] From the attack methodology point of view, the closest attack proposal to this paper is the attak proposed by Tupsamudre et al [9], aiming at SPECK cipher. Since SPECK uses the ARX structure as well, authors aimed at the only non-linear operation, at the modular addition.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Fault Attack on LEA

Jap

Breier

2015

Information and Communication Technology

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Abstract. LEA is a symmetric block cipher proposed in 2014. It uses ARX design and its main advantage is the possibility of a fast software implementation on common computing platforms. In this paper we propose a Differential Fault Analysis attack on LEA. By injecting random bit faults in the last round and in the penultimate round, we were able to recover the secret key by using 258 faulty encryptions in average. If the position of faults is known, then only 62 faulty encryptions are needed in order to recover the key which surpasses the results achieved so far.Keywords: LEA, Fault Attack, DFA IntroductionToday's applications require efficient ciphers that can run on small devices with constrained computing power. Recent trends show an increasing number of services intended for Internet of Things [8,5] requiring both high level of security and fast running speed on embedded devices. For such applications, lightweight cryptography is an ideal choice.LEA [6] is a symmetric block cipher, using the ARX design (modular Addition, bitwise Rotation, and bitwise XOR). It offers fast software encryption, comparable to lightweight ciphers, and comes in the same key size variants as AES. There is an exhaustive security analysis report published by Bogdanov et al. [2], stating that the cipher is secure against known cryptanalysis attacks. So far, there was only one attempt to break the cipher using fault analysis method, which requires 300 chosen fault injections for recovering the 128-bit secret key.In this paper we present a Differential Fault Analysis attack on LEA. We exploit properties of a non-linearity of modular addition operation used in a round function. To recover the key, our attack requires two different positions of fault injections -in the last round and in the penultimate round. By using a random bit-flip model, we were able to recover a 128-bit secret key by using ≈258 faulty ciphertexts in average. If the precise fault position is known, our attack requires only ≈62 faulty ciphertexts in average. Thus, our method overcomes the fault attack on LEA published so far. This paper is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of related work in Section 2. LEA cipher is described in details in Section 3. Section 4 provides methodology of our fault attack, following by Section 5 which summarizes our simulation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work and provides motivation for further work. Related WorkSince the first publication proposing a fault analysis as a method to retrieve the secret information from the encryption process proposed by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton in 1997 [3] From the attack methodology point of view, the closest attack proposal to this paper is the attak proposed by Tupsamudre et al. [9], aiming at SPECK cipher. Since SPECK uses the ARX structure as well, authors aimed at the only non-linear operation, at the modular addition. They were able to recover the n-bit secret key by using n/3 bit faults on average. LEA CipherIn this section we will describe a symmetric block cipher...

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Differential Fault Analysis on the Families of SIMON and SPECK Ciphers

Cited by 57 publications

References 8 publications

Parallel Implementations of SIMON and SPECK

Parallel Implementations of SIMON and SPECK

Strengthening SIMON Implementation Against Intelligent Fault Attacks

Differential Fault Attack on LEA

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