Differentiated Integration and Disintegration in the EU after Brexit: Risks versus Opportunities

Abstract

Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multifaceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a ground‐breaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five empirical models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the EU: the European economic area model, the Danish model of (quasi‐)permanent differentiation, the Swedish model of de facto differentiation, the instrumental model and the Brexit process of differentiation. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article also introduces the contributions to this symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit.

Postfunctional differentiation, functional reintegration: the Danish case in Justice and Home Affairs

“…The case of Denmark in the area of JHA is particularly suitable, as it possesses strong empirical features suggesting a positive causal connection between the variables of interest (Welle & Barnes, 2014). In fact, Denmark is considered as a model of '(quasi)-permanent' differentiation (Leruth et al, 2019a) and, especially in JHA policies, the Danish optouts represent the major long-term consequences of a negative integration referendum in the history of the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2019a). On top of this, JHA is one of the policy areas subject to the most impressive development in the post-Maastricht era (Monar, 2012), which makes it likely to produce high levels of interdependence between member states.…”

The Democratic Dilemmas of Differentiated Integration: The Views of Political Party Actors

“…Unless flanked by strong mechanisms of transparency and participation for outsiders, and a clear pathway for them being able to join the policy eventually should they wish to do so, capacity DI could lead to a negative demarcation between the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of integration, entrench divisions between them (Leruth et al. 2019: 1386), and reduce mutual trust between MS (Adler‐Nissen 2011; Michailidou and Trenz 2018). Even more than sovereignty DI, therefore, capacity DI has a dominating potential, whereby an inner group of EU MS can condemn newcomers to an inferior peripheral status (Fossum 2015).…”

Party Positions on Differentiated European Integration in the Nordic Countries: Growing Together, Growing Apart?

“…Both the United Kingdom and Denmark, through their opposition towards some aspects of the Maastricht Treaty (albeit for diverging reasons), are considered as the pioneers of differentiation. Altogether four 'models' of integration that are championed by Nordic countries are discernible in the literature (see Leruth, Gänzle, & Trondal, 2019).…”

“…As far as the Sweden Democrats are concerned, it should be noted that the party's success is more recent than in other Nordic countries, meaning it did not play a significant role in the 1994 EU membership referendum. Since the early 2000s, the Sweden Democrats have embraced an ambiguous approach to the Swedish 'EU debate,' ranging from support for the existing de facto Swedish opt-outs from the EU to advocating a 'Swexit' in 2018 following the outcome of the Brexit referendum (Leruth et al, 2019). In Denmark, the Danish People's Party has been in favour of the existing de jure Danish opt-outs from the EU, but since the Brexit vote, the party has become divided over whether it should support a Danish withdrawal from the EU altogether, or not.…”