Differentiating Contemporary Racial Prejudice from Old-Fashioned Racial Prejudice

Abstract

The present study addresses the distinction between contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice using survey data from a national sample (n=600) of self-identified whites living in the United States and interviewed by telephone in 2001. First, we examine associations among indicators of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. Consistent with the literature, contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators represent two distinct but correlated common factors. Second, we examine whether belief in genetic race differences uniformly predicts both types of prejudice. As might be expected, belief in genetic race differences predicts old-fashioned prejudice but contrary to recent theorizing, it also predicts contemporary prejudice.

One ring to rule them all: Master discourses of enlightenment—and racism—from colonial to contemporary New Zealand

“…In recent decades, psychologists have incorporated new understandings of more subtle forms of racism, with theoretical and empirical differentiation between ‘old‐fashioned’ and modern, subtle or symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, ; Liu & Mills, ; Pettigrew & Meertens, ; Sears, ). Old‐fashioned racism is characterized by outright or blatant preference for one group over another, beliefs about the inherent inferiority of certain groups and open expressions of such beliefs (Brown, Akiyama, White, Jayaratne, & Anderson, ). This may include beliefs about the superiority of European civilization over indigenous social structures, in line with Belich's () work on how ignorance of outgroup achievements can serve to valorise ingroup institutions (see Wetherell & Potter, for discursive theory).…”

Discord Over DNA: Ideological Responses to Scientific Communication about Genes and Race

“…In this paper, we separate factual beliefs about the causes of perceived black-white differences from racial affect . In the contemporary United States, such factual beliefs are distinct both conceptually and empirically from a desire among whites for social distance from blacks as well as from racial resentment and symbolic racism (negative sentiment toward blacks justified by claims they disregard shared values) (Brown et al 2009). Even so, there is a modest relationship among these concepts (see Brown et al 2009; Jayaratne et al 2006); thus, we control for racial prejudice in the models.…”

“…In the contemporary United States, such factual beliefs are distinct both conceptually and empirically from a desire among whites for social distance from blacks as well as from racial resentment and symbolic racism (negative sentiment toward blacks justified by claims they disregard shared values) (Brown et al 2009). Even so, there is a modest relationship among these concepts (see Brown et al 2009; Jayaratne et al 2006); thus, we control for racial prejudice in the models. Specifically, the full statistical models control for: social distance , which sums the answers to two questions asking respondents how bothered they would be if their son or daughter dated or married a black person; negative affect , which is measured by asking respondents how often they feel disgusted by blacks (see Banks and Valentino 2012); and contemporary prejudice , which is a seven-item additive scale (see Brown et al 2009) intended to gauge subtler forms of race prejudice ( α = .74).…”

“…Even so, there is a modest relationship among these concepts (see Brown et al 2009; Jayaratne et al 2006); thus, we control for racial prejudice in the models. Specifically, the full statistical models control for: social distance , which sums the answers to two questions asking respondents how bothered they would be if their son or daughter dated or married a black person; negative affect , which is measured by asking respondents how often they feel disgusted by blacks (see Banks and Valentino 2012); and contemporary prejudice , which is a seven-item additive scale (see Brown et al 2009) intended to gauge subtler forms of race prejudice ( α = .74).…”

“…Further, the power of biology to “excuse” individuals for stigmatized characteristics helps to explain why those on the left are more likely than those on the right to make genetic attributions in some instances, including for homosexuality (Garretson and Suhay 2016; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008), obesity (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2017), and criminal behavior (Shen and Gromet 2015). Even with respect to racial inequality, there is potential for whites who believe genes are the cause to turn to paternalism, not antipathy—to “feel that blacks are simply incapable of improving their lot in life and, as a result, feel sympathy for them” (Brown et al 2009, 107).…”