Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity Is Not Like Other Kinds<sup>1</sup>

Haidt, Jonathan; Rosenberg, Evan C.; Hom, Holly

doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb02071.x

Cited by 157 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Indeed, actual residential mobility and even contemplating migrating increases people's familiarity-seeking behavior (Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, & Ratliff, 2011). As discussed above, ideological and moral similarity appears to be more appealing than mere surface-level similarity (see also Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). So, an influence on migration may be seeking environments populated by ideologically-similar others (Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986;Karylowski, 1976;Werner & Parmelee, 1979).…”

Section: Intuitions Steer Selective Migration Into Ideological Enclavesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, ideological homogeneity may reduce daily interpersonal conflict with dissimilar others. Indeed, among types of diversity, ideological moral diversity is very unpopular (Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). Without fear of reprisal for expressing one's values, one may be able to more easily form strong interpersonal bonds and accumulate social capital (see Coleman, 1988;Putnam, 2000).…”

Section: Ideological Enclaves Promote Intrapersonal Interpersonal Amentioning

confidence: 99%

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Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

Motyl¹

2017

Preprint

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Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividingConservatives may not be from Mars and liberals may not be from Venus, but they are dividing into Red and Blue worlds. And this is increasingly so in recent decades. Despite the fact that most national elections are relatively close, where the winner prevails by a couple of percentage points, the United States of America is becoming increasingly the (not so) United Red and Blue States of America. This is most pronounced in smaller, more localized geographic units like neighborhoods and census tracts, where one party wins elections in a landslide and residents rarely communicate with people who hold differing political values (Bishop, 2009;Mutz, 2006). Blue communities are home to disproportionately many Democrats and Red communities are home to disproportionately many Republicans, and both these communities and the residents of these communities differ in many ways beyond simple partisan identification. For example, residents of blue communities are more likely to identify as "spiritual, but not religious," while residents of red communities are much more likely to identify as religious (Abramowitz, 2012). Similarly, 50% of residents in Red America own guns, but only 19% of residents in Blue America own guns. Moreover, recent survey data suggests that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals report feeling stigmatized and they do not belong in red states where the majority of the population has supported banning same-sex marriage and forbidding non-heterosexuals from teaching in public schools (Lick, Tornello, Riskind, Schmidt, & Patterson, 2012). This sense of not belonging triggers selective migration to places where people feel that they are accepted and that they do belong (Motyl, 2014;Motyl et al., 2014). Some evidence even suggests that LGBT individuals may be fleeing red communities and heading for greener (or, more rainbow-patterned) pastures Smart & Klein, 2013). With LGBT individuals emigrating from red communities, there are fewer opportunities for people in red communities to befriend LGBT individuals. These are just a few instances of a broader phenomenon of ideological migration that has resulted in the growing segregation of Red America and Blue America.In this chapter, I propose Ideological Enclavement Theory to explain how Red and Blue America emerged and what the consequences of living in these ideologically-segregated enclaves are. This theory identifies two primary antecedent causes. First, people have gut-level intuitions about the ideology of different enclaves, and when the ideology of a community matches people's personal ideology, people infer that they would fit in that community. Second, when people have the opportunity to do so, they will selectively migrate into enclaves that share their ideology. This ideological migration process operates to satisfy basic psychological needs, like the need to belong and a sense of physical security, and to pursue higher-level psychological goals, like self-transcendence. Thes...

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Section: Intuitions Steer Selective Migration Into Ideological Enclavesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ideological Enclaves Promote Intrapersonal Interpersonal Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

Motyl¹

2017

Preprint

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“…Certain types of similarity may be more attractive than others. For example, moral value similarity is more important in selecting others as friends (Haidt, Hom, & Rosenberg, 2003), teammates in the workplace (Guillaume, Bridbock, & Ricketta, 2012), and neighbors (Putnam, 2007). So, an influence on migration may be seeking environments where are there more similar others on specific important characteristics such as lifestyle, values, and political ideology (Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986;Karylowski, 1976;Werner & Parmelee, 1979).…”

Section: Migrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How ideological migration geographically segregates groups

Motyl

Iyer

Oishi

et al. 2014

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

212

164

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Here, we advance the ideological migration hypothesis -individuals choose to live in communities with ideologies similar to their own to satisfy their need to belong. In Study 1, incongruity between personal and community ideology predicted greater residential mobility and attraction to more ideologically-congruent communities. In Study 2, participants who perceived their ideology to be at odds with their community's displayed a decreased sense of belonging and an increased desire to migrate. In Studies 3 and 4, participants induced to view their current community as growing more incongruent with their own ideology expressed a decreased sense of belonging and an increased desire to migrate. Ideological migration may contribute to the rise in cultural, moral, and ideological segregation and polarization of the American electorate.

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“…But even within the realm of anthropocentric truths, moral facts are especially potent. Groups can usually tolerate a diversity of beliefs about beauty and comedy, but moral diversity is much more damaging (Haidt et al 2003). One cannot even coherently want moral diversity.…”

Section: Invisible Fences Of the Moral Domainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ingenious studies by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues demonstrate that most people find it intuitively wrong to wash one's toilet with the American flag, eat one's recently expired pet, or masturbate into a dead chicken (Haidt 2001;Haidt et al 2003). When asked to make the most rational judgment possible, liberals appear to correct for their intuitions -reducing blame for eating Fido, for example (Uhlmann et al, in preparation; see also Haidt & Hersh 2001).…”

Section: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2005) 28:4mentioning

confidence: 99%

what's in a heuristic?

Hahn¹,

Frost²,

Maio³

2005

Behav Brain Sci

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With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics -mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too -moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. Examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. In all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and policy. One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, including those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.Cass R. Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. His many books include Laws of Fear (2005), Why Societies Need Dissent (2003), and Risk and Reason (2002). Much of his research explores the intersection of psychology, economics, and law; he has been particularly interested in the role of cognitive errors and social influences on juries, legislators, judges, and those who are the objects of law's commands. He is now working on a book on the production of social knowledge, with special reference to information aggregation across persons.that some of our deeply held moral beliefs might be products of heuristics that sometimes produce mistakes.If moral heuristics are in fact pervasive, then people with diverse foundational commitments should be able to agree, not that their own preferred theories are wrong, but that they are often applied in a way that reflects the use of heuristics. Utilitarians ought to be able to identify heuristics for the maximization of utility; deontologists should be able to point to heuristics for the proper discharge of moral responsibilities; and those uncommitted to any large-scale theory should be able to specify heuristics for their own more modest normative commitments. And if moral heuristics exist, blunders are highly likely not only in moral thinking, but in legal and political practice as well. Conventional legal and political arguments are often a product of heuristics masquerading as universal truths. Hence, I will identify a set of political and legal judgments that are best understood as a product of heuristics, and that are often taken, wrongly and damagingly, as a guide to political and legal p...

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Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity Is Not Like Other Kinds¹

Cited by 157 publications

References 38 publications

Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

How ideological migration geographically segregates groups

what's in a heuristic?

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Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity Is Not Like Other Kinds1

Cited by 157 publications

References 38 publications

Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

Liberals and conservatives are (geographically) dividing

How ideological migration geographically segregates groups

what's in a heuristic?

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Product

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Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity Is Not Like Other Kinds¹