Differentiation competition between new and remanufactured products considering third-party remanufacturing

X, Sun; Zhou, Yancong; Li, Yongjian; Govindan, Kannan; Han, Xiaonan

doi:10.1080/01605682.2018.1512843

Cited by 45 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In the future, analysis can be done for a scenario in which firms differentiate between remanufactured and brand-new products. Sun et al [72] illustrated the concept of differentiation competition in remanufacturing. Further, the proposed framework can be used under both price and service competition because buying decisions are also influenced by services besides pricing.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Singhal

Jena

Aich³

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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Business organizations all around the globe are looking to expand circular models into their supply chains to harness economic and environmental benefits. Moreover, the act of giving incentives to retailers by the manufacturer is also quite prevalent in the present business environment. These incentives are offered to promote the sales of products of a manufacturer. Therefore, this paper examines the optimal decisions for a dual-retailer closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the manufacturer bestows the credit period to the one retailer (a firm that possesses shallow market penetration and has a higher insistence on the usage of the capital venture), and cash discount to the next retailer (a firm that occupies the market to a greater extent and receives lower thrust on the usage of invested capital) under a non-coordinated system and coordinated systems. This study proposes the mathematical model to determine the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in terms of credit period and cash discount and also compute the optimal decisions of the retailers for their retail prices and order quantities to maximize individual’s profit in the CLSC. Moreover, numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis is performed to get insights into the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and retailers. The results of sensitivity analysis show that credit period and cash discount increases with the rise in price elasticity, and decreases with an increase in cross-price elasticity. The findings also confirm that members of dual-retailer CLSC under coordination and manufacture’s incentive scenario generate higher environmental and economic benefits required to attain sustainability in production and consumption.

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Section: Limitations and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Singhal

Jena

Aich³

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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“…On the one hand, the channel competition between remanufacturing and new products is always the focal point of studies. For example, some research (e.g., [ 9 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 ]) explored the impact of remanufactured products on new products and the two-sided competition in different channel structures in the supply chain. On the other hand, firms have increasingly been interested in secondary markets and platform operations.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing Marketing Decisions in the Presence of Retailing Platforms in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Qiao

Zhao

Zou

2021

IJERPH

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Background: In response to the specific goals of carbon peaking and neutrality, remanufacture is becoming increasingly popular. With the marketplace being more and more adopted, an independent remanufacturer (IR) could sell its products via either the reselling model or the marketplace model. In order to contribute more to carbon neutrality, we investigate the optimal marketing decision for remanufacturing. We construct two models namely reselling model and the marketplace model, and further explore the effects of each marketing model on the decisions and profits of both the IR and the platform firm. Methods: We examine a platform firm that sells new products and an IR that sells remanufactured products under two marketing models based on game theory: (1) a reselling model in which the IR sells remanufactured products to the platform firm; then the platform firm resells to consumers; (2) a marketplace model in which the IR sells remanufactured products to consumers through the platform. Results: Our results show that aiming at carbon neutrality, the IR would be induced by the marketplace model to undertake remanufacturing operations and remanufacture products as many as it could still meet the market demand. Meanwhile, the marketplace model encourages the IR to rethink its work and manufacture more products under certain conditions. Furthermore, both the platform firm and the IR prefer the marketplace model to the reselling model within a Pareto zone. In addition, we find that both the platform firm and the IR could benefit from the marketplace model when they take carbon neutrality under consideration. Conclusions: This study provides managerial insight from two aspects. Remanufactures could decide their marketing model via thorough consideration of market competition, commission rate, and production cost. The government could do more to protect the marketplace environment in order to stimulate the internal vitality of the platform in the achievement march of carbon neutrality purpose. That is, this study will provide good guidance for sustainable development decision-making of remanufacturing marketing platforms, and further contributes to the achievement of the carbon neutrality goal.

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“…Sun et al. (2020) discuss the optimal decisions of an OEM, an IR, and a retailer when consumers believe that new and remanufactured products are different. Tang et al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The prices and quality of new and remanufactured products in a new market segment

Qiao

2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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This paper studies the optimal prices and quality of new and remanufactured products, and especially discusses the quality adjustment of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in a new market segment that consists of the indifferent segment and the new product only segment. Consumers in the first segment have the same willingness to pay for new and remanufactured products, while consumers in the second segment are only willing to purchase new products. We use the proportion of consumers in the indifferent segment accounting for all consumers to segment the market. We present game models and employ backward induction to derive the optimal prices and quality in three scenarios: the monopolist OEM no‐remanufacturing, the monopolist OEM remanufacturing, and an OEM no‐remanufacturing but an independent remanufacturer (IR) remanufacturing. When the OEM or the IR remanufactures, we find that the OEM cannot lower the product quality. In addition, we compare the optimal quality between the unsegmented and segmented market for each scenario. The results show the OEM should increase its product quality under certain conditions after the OEM realizes that there is a segmented market. Furthermore, we conduct numerical analyses to discuss the impact of related parameters on practitioners’ profits, which provides more guidelines for practitioners.

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Differentiation competition between new and remanufactured products considering third-party remanufacturing

Cited by 45 publications

References 34 publications

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Remanufacturing Marketing Decisions in the Presence of Retailing Platforms in the Carbon Neutrality Era

The prices and quality of new and remanufactured products in a new market segment

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