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This article studies a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer produces two substitutable products and offers respective service levels to customers who buy one of the two products. Each retailer can only order one kind of product from the manufacturer, and then sell them to the market at a certain sale price. The demands for two products are influenced not only by the service levels the manufacturer provides, but also the sales prices of the two products. Furthermore, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of members in the supply chain with the aid of the Stackelberg game, and discover a number of insights concerning some important parameters. Finally, Numerical analysis is presented to validate our theoretical results and compare channel performances.

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Supply disruption may cause strong complaints of customers, which is a cost loss for the firms in the supply chain. Obviously, if realizing that there is the disruption risk, the members in a supply chain will adjust their decisions. For analyzing the influence, we consider a popular supply chain mode with dual channels, where one manufacturer has its direct sales channel and one traditional retailer channel. The manufacturer may suffer a supply disruption so that all ordered products by the retailer or the direct retail channel will be lost, and the members in supply chain will bear the corresponding disruption penalty from the customers. By considering four structures with different market power relations, the closed-form optimal price decisions of the four models are given. We found that the disruption factor improves the sales prices for any member structure as compared to the supply chain without the disruption. And the direct retail prices in the different modes are the same as each other, but the price of the traditional channel is influenced by the market share. And the sorts of the sales prices under different structures are given. We also conduct some extensive numerical analysis and compare the results under different structures. We observe that the expected optimal profits of considering the external penalty are smaller than those of no external penalty, and we give a sort of the optimal expected profits. And we also provide the effects of some parameters on the optimal decisions and the optimal expected profits.