Digitally Assisted Mixed-Signal Circuit Security

Abstract

The design and manufacturing steps of a chip typically involve several parties. For example, a chip may comprise several third-party Intellectual Property (IP) cores and the Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication may be outsourced to a third-party foundry. IP cores and ICs are shared with potentially untrusted third parties and, as a result, are subject to piracy attacks. Even more, any legally purchased chip may be reverse-engineered to retrieve the design down to transistorlevel and, thereby, it is also subject to piracy attacks. In this paper, we propose MixLock, an anti-piracy countermeasure for mixed-signal IP cores and ICs. MixLock protection is based on inserting a lock mechanism into the design such that correct functionality is established only after applying a key which is the designer's secret. The lock mechanism acts on the mixedsignal performances by leveraging logic locking of the digital part. MixLock presents several key attributes. It is generally applicable, it is non-intrusive to the sensitive analog section, it incurs no performance penalty and has very low area and power overheads, it is fully automated, and it is capable of co-optimizing security in both the analog and digital domains. We demonstrate MixLock on a Σ∆ Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) using hardware measurements and an audio demonstrator.

Anti-Piracy Design of RF Transceivers

“…For a recent review of logic locking techniques and counter-attacks the reader is referred to [3]. Leveraging logic locking to lock a mixedsignal design via locking its digital section was proposed in [15]- [17]. In [15], locking targeted the digital processor in the feedback calibration loop, while in [16], [17] locking targeted digital blocks within the signal processing chain.…”

“…Leveraging logic locking to lock a mixedsignal design via locking its digital section was proposed in [15]- [17]. In [15], locking targeted the digital processor in the feedback calibration loop, while in [16], [17] locking targeted digital blocks within the signal processing chain. This latter locking approach, called MixLock, was demonstrated recently for RF transceivers [18].…”

Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected Synchronization

“…If the attack is staged by the foundry, pre-silicon prevention methods include: (a) filling in all unused spaces on the layout, which are most likely insertion areas for the HT, with functional filler cells and checking if those have changed [53]; and (b) design obfuscation, for example using locking [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], camouflaging [61], [62], [63], or split manufacturing [64], [65], aiming at obscuring the circuit functionality so as to make it difficult for the attacker to insert the HT.…”

Single Power Supply, Compact, Self-Adaptive Dynamic Range Lock-In Amplifiers

“…Alternatively, since the amplitude of the desired signal is much more meaningful than its initial phase part, the absolute design has been introduced [19]. Given that hybrid circuits leverage the strengths of digital circuits, which excel at handling discrete values and performing complex logic operations, with the advantages of analog circuits, which are highly efficient at processing continuous signals and interfacing with the real world [20][21][22], this technique illustrates a promising future among sensing, electromagnetic measuring, and weak optical signal detecting.…”