Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

Abstract

Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality

“…First, the IMF may want to appear responsive to domestic interests+ Paragraph four of the 1979 guidelines on conditionality includes language suggesting that the IMF should pay due regard to the country's social and political objectives, economic priorities, and circumstances+ 37 By reducing the intrusiveness of labor market reform conditions in countries with powerful domestic labor, the IMF demonstrates sensitivity to the political realities in borrowing countries+ Second, the IMF wants its programs to be successful and success depends on implementation-powerful domestic actors can thwart the implementation of IMF conditions+ 38 According to one IMF study, only 25 percent of structural adjustment programs between 1986 and 1997 were completed without interruptions+ Domestic political constraints such as political upheavals, flagging commitment from the authorities~often a consequence of difficulty in mustering political support for new policies!, and opposition from domestic interest groups played a role in most of the program interruptions+ 39 Because the IMF is interested in maximizing the success0implementation of its programs, the organization is unlikely to require highly intrusive labor market reforms in the face of powerful domestic labor+ 35+ Ramcharan 2002+ Remmer 1986 and Edwards and Santaella 1993 make a similar argument although they focus more on the utility of scapegoating the IMF+ Putnam 1988 We pursue two strategies for substantiating these hypotheses: case studies and statistical tests+ The case study of South Korea, followed by a short contrast with the case of Bolivia, maps out the causal dynamics that underlie the statistical models, providing a rich picture of how labor opposes IMF labor-market reform conditions, how national governments respond to labor, and the IMF 's support for government efforts to integrate labor into the reform process+ Statistical analyses then provide a rigorous empirical test of our argument's plausibility+…”

Brazil's Emerging Role in Global Governance: Health, Food Security and Bioenergy

“…There is, however, one final aspect of the book that should be critically assessed in order to stimulate debate. Although this work is predominantly located in the field of international relations, and although the crucial role of national institutions in each of the three sectors is duly emphasized, perhaps the insights brought about by Putnam's (1988) …”

Climate Policy in India: What Shapes International, National and State Policy?

“…Our analytical approach draws on elements of competing perspectives in international political economy, adopting a synthetic framework that recognizes the roles that individual actors, institutions and particular ideas can play in motivating decision makers. Further, we make use of Robert Putnam's concept of 'Two Level Games' (Putnam 1988), which argues that national policy makers are subject to interests and influences at both international and domestic levels, and this influence runs in both directions, from higher levels to lower levels (e.g. international factors can shape domestic decisions) and vice versa (e.g.…”

“…Political leaders, like civil society organisations, construct their discourses under the influence of norms and interests at the domestic level and, increasingly, ideas and aspirations at the international level. This multi-directional relationship between the international and domestic arenas, as argued by Putnam (1988), is illuminated in the Indian case by seeing both the effect that economic development objectives and a strong sense of national sovereignty have over climate diplomacy on the one hand, and the influence that international institutions have had over national policy and institutions on the other. Likewise, the noticeable shift in Indian climate diplomacy from around 2007 onwards (though picking up pace from 2009) correlates with the emergence of India's first comprehensive domestic policies on climate change, specifically the NAPCC in 2008.…”

“…Recognizing these interlinkages can, according to Putnam (1988), have 'powerful consequences' for choices at both domestic and international levels. In other words, understanding the most influential factors shaping India's climate policy can open up space for other parties to initiate more productive efforts at cooperation with India.…”