Direct selling, agent selling, or dual-format selling: Electronic channel configuration considering channel competition and platform service

Zhang, Cuihua; Li, Yanting; Ma, Yue

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2021.107368

Cited by 48 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…When the cost is high, encroachment can benefit the retailer. Zhang, Li et al (2021) demonstrate that the manufacturer with a retail channel prefers establishing an electronic channel with agency selling, besides direct selling. Matsui (2022) demonstrates that if there is only the retail channel, bargaining over the wholesale price is profitable for the retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the era of e‐commerce, selling products through multiple channels is a common phenomenon (He et al, 2022; Pu et al, 2019). Some manufacturers who sell products through an indirect e‐retail channel may also sell products through the direct channel (Huang et al, 2020; Zhang, Li et al, 2021). For example, 80% of Amazon's manufacturers sell products through their own websites (Wang et al, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Many manufacturers sell products through both the e‐retail and direct channels, which may lead to channel conflicts. To alleviate this, quality differentiation becomes an important marketing strategy for the manufacturer. However, few studies investigate how the form of the e‐tailer's selling contract affects the manufacturer's distribution strategy. Here, we investigate this by establishing a game model in which a manufacturer sells two products with similar functions, but different quality levels, through the direct channel and an e‐tailer. The manufacturer may distribute high‐ and low‐quality products through the direct and e‐tailer channels, respectively, or vice versa. The e‐tailer can choose either the reselling or agency selling contracts. We find that the impact of quality differentiation on equilibria depends on the distribution strategy, contract form, and level of product competition. Under the reselling contract, the manufacturer (he) should distribute high‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency of low‐ to high‐quality products is low. Under the agency selling contract, he should distribute low‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency is moderate. Finally, the e‐tailer (she) should choose the agency selling contract if the production cost is moderate, regardless of the manufacturer's distribution strategy.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Among them, some studies investigated channel distribution from the perspective of an upstream manufacturer. They studied a manufacturer's choice of direct and indirect sales channels, such as He et al [11], Wang et al [15], Chen et al [16], Pun et al [17], and Zhang et al [18]. On the contrary, some studies investigated channel distribution from the perspective of a downstream retailer.…”

Section: Channel Distribution In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brand-Owners’ Exclusive Channel Strategies in Multitier Supply Chains: Effect of Contract Unobservability

Xiong

Zhuo

2023

Sustainability

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In multitier supply chains, brand-owners often form exclusive deals with downstream retailers or upstream suppliers. Therefore, the selection of exclusive channel strategies becomes a critical decision for brand owners, resulting in three typical structures: a flexible structure, an exclusive retailing-channel structure, and an exclusive purchasing-channel structure. This paper contributes to the literature by formulating these three representative channel structures in a three-tier supply chain. Both observable and unobservable contracts are considered in each structure. We build game-theoretical models and derive the equilibrium outcomes under observable and unobservable contracts. We find that the exclusive retailing channel is more beneficial for brand-owners, regardless of whether the contracts are observable or unobservable. Additionally, the exclusive retailing channel benefits the entire supply chain more than the exclusive purchasing channel when the level of channel substitutability is low (high) under contract observability (unobservability). With regard to the effect of contract unobservability, we find that it can benefit brand-owners when the level of channel substitutability is low, but it can harm them when the level of channel substitutability is high. Furthermore, we explore the effects of channel substitutability and demonstrate that brand-owners’ performance can be positively and negatively affected by the channel substitutability under contract unobservability. Our findings provide operational strategies for brand-owners to form exclusive channels in a multitier supply chain.

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“…(2020) and Zhang et al. (2021a), the service cost of live streaming channel depends on the service level provided by L. Thus, the service investment cost is assumed to be a convex function of the service level, that is,

\frac{1}{2} s^2

(Li et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2021b). In addition, since E and L only display the products (Liu et al., 2021), while M produces products and processes customer orders, we assume that the unit operation cost of E‐commerce platform or live streaming channel is zero, that is,

c_e=c_l=0

(Li et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2021a).…”

Section: Problem Description and Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operation strategy in an E‐commerce platform supply chain: whether and how to introduce live streaming services?

Zhang

Chen

Zhi

2022

Int Trans Operational Res

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E‐commerce platforms provide sales channels for enterprises to exploit more markets. Meanwhile, E‐commerce platform supply chain members are increasingly using live streaming services to boost profits. However, whether to introduce live streaming services to E‐commerce platform supply chain and which operation strategy to implement is unclear. In this study, we construct three models to examine the operation strategy in an E‐commerce platform supply chain by considering live streaming services. The results show that introducing live streaming services is always beneficial for both the E‐commerce platform and live streaming services supplier. When live streaming services is introduced and an appropriate revenue sharing proportion and signing fees are set by the E‐commerce platform supply chain members, the operation strategy of live streaming services introduced and implemented by the manufacturer is the consistent choice for E‐commerce platform supply chain members, which is also beneficial for E‐commerce platform supply chain system and consumers.

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Direct selling, agent selling, or dual-format selling: Electronic channel configuration considering channel competition and platform service

Cited by 48 publications

References 66 publications

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Brand-Owners’ Exclusive Channel Strategies in Multitier Supply Chains: Effect of Contract Unobservability

Operation strategy in an E‐commerce platform supply chain: whether and how to introduce live streaming services?

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