Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks<sup>*</sup>

Leider, Stephen; Möbius, Markus; Rosenblat, Tanya; Do, Quoc-Anh

doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815

Cited by 358 publications

(349 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…12 The non-anonymous treatment was inspired by the experimental design of Leider et al (2009). Note that we randomized the order of the dictator games (DGA versus DGNA) as well as the order of the decisions (stranger versus friend pairing).…”

Section: Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Binzel

Fehr

2013

Journal of Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 7183 January 2013 ABSTRACT Social Distance and Trust: Experimental Evidence from a Slum in Cairo *While strong social ties help individuals cope with missing institutions, trade is essentially limited to those who are part of the social network. We examine what makes the decision to trust a stranger different from the decision to trust a member of a given social network (a friend), by comparing the determinants of these two decisions for the same individual. We implement a binary trust game with hidden action in a lab-in-the-field experiment with residents of an informal housing area in Cairo. Our results show that trust is higher among friends than among strangers and that higher trust among friends is related to the principal's belief of trustworthiness. However, on average a principal underestimates her friend's trustworthiness leading to inefficient outcomes. Our findings suggest that even within a social network, trade may often be limited to exchanges with few information asymmetries. JEL Classification:C72, C93, D82, O12

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Section: Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Binzel

Fehr

2013

Journal of Development Economics

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“…For example, List et al (2004), Leider et al (2009), andDellaVigna et al (2011) try to measure the 'why' of sharing, and find that social pressure and incentive-based motives are important. Barr and Genicot (2008) and Attanasio et al (2009) try to understand the 'who' of sharing.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As in Leider et al (2009), we attempt to distinguish among different motives for sharing. Although there are three critical differences between our experiment and theirs, we can replicate all of their relevant main results with our data (as we discuss in Section 5.2).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Motives for sharing in social networks

Ligon

Schechter

2012

Journal of Development Economics

104

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What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed 'real-world' gift-giving, while other motives measured in the experiment do not predict behavior outside the experiment.JEL codes: C92, C93, D03, D64, D85, O17.$ Schechter thanks the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the Delta Foundation for funding. We are grateful to Idelin Molinas and everyone at Instituto Desarrollo for their support and advice while in Paraguay. Paul Niehaus, several anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Dartmouth, Maryland, Ohio State, Princeton, UC Berkeley, Yale, BREAD at Duke, MWIEDC at UW Madison, and SITE at Stanford provided helpful comments.

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“…Despite the relative simplicity of the protocol, we obtained an average of 42.2% bidirectional links. This procedure resulted in a very accurate mapping of social correspondences when compared to more sophisticated protocols used for analogous purposes [26,28,29].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

Kovářík

Brañas–Garza

Cobo-Reyes

et al. 2012

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members' adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects' prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.

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Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks^*

Cited by 358 publications

References 38 publications

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Motives for sharing in social networks

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

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Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks*

Cited by 358 publications

References 38 publications

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Motives for sharing in social networks

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

Contact Info

Product

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Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks^*