Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Binzel, Christine; Fehr, Dietmar

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.009

Cited by 92 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…A disadvantage is that our analysis cannot contribute much to the literature on network formation and the differential performances of formed networks, as our neighbors are set according to distance and, thus, are practically given. 2 Second, our paper adds to the body of literature that found the effects of social ties in the real world on social behavior in their experiments (Binzel and Fehr, 2013;Etang et al, 2011;Goette et al, 2012). Our paper is consistent with these predecessors in that the farmers' experience of collective irrigation management is associated with the interdependence of general social behaviors in the experiment.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Neighborhood effects and social behavior: The case of irrigated and rainfed farmers in Bohol, the Philippines

Tsusaka

Kajisa

Pede

et al. 2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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a b s t r a c tArtifactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household surveys are combined in a single study to investigate the neighborhood effects of social behaviors. The dictator and public goods games are conducted among rice farmers in irrigated and non-irrigated areas in the Philippines. We find the neighborhood effects but the magnitude and statistical significance of endogenous social effects vary with the irrigation availability, type of social behavior, and type of neighborhood. Altruistic and cooperative behaviors are significantly influenced by the behaviors of neighbors only in the irrigated area, where social ties are strengthened through collective irrigation management. Through this effect, irrigated farmers' social behaviors become similar to those of one another. Neighborhood effects for cooperative behavior are stronger among farm plot neighbors than among residential neighbors, which may reflect their interactions in irrigation management. Although nondynamic, these findings are consistent with the theory of social norm evolution through common pool resource management.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Neighborhood effects and social behavior: The case of irrigated and rainfed farmers in Bohol, the Philippines

Tsusaka

Kajisa

Pede

et al. 2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The average of global scores within evaluates initial safe peers and new peers. We confirm how global scores change when aggregation [16], [17] cycle increases and ratio of initial peers decreases.…”

Section: Global Scores Of Safe Peerssupporting

confidence: 66%

A Reliable Peer-to-Peer Platform for Adding New Node Using Trust Based Model

Vimal¹,

Srivatsa²

2017

IJECE

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In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating peers in unstructured peer-to-peer networks, Reputation aggregation methods are used in this method. Each and every peer of the network will collect the local scores of each transaction and will compute global scores by aggregating all the local scores with the help of global scores, each individual peer can interact with its suitable peers. But the existing method will not consider the score of the new peer. In this condition, requests are handled by existing peers who leads to failure in downloading process. To rectify this, NP-TRUST model is used to distribute the request to all peers including the newly joined peers. The proposed method is compared with gossip and DFR-TRUST model in Transaction Success rate and variation in file request. Keyword: Trust management Security and reputation aggregation Copyright © 2017 Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science.All rights reserved. Corresponding Author:Vimal S, Sathyabama University, Tamilnadu, Chennai. Email: vimalshan@gmail.com INTRODUCTIONP2P networks are attaining more attention now by the way of file sharing. In file sharing, every peer can join the network and download files. Due to open nature and anonymous network an ideal environment for malicious peer to spread virus is offered by the system. Reputation aggregation methods are used to avoid downloading inauthentic files. The trust of the system will show the reliability and safety of peers and quantified trusts [1], [2] are known as reputation score by these trusts, individual peer will avoid transaction with malicious peers. The peer with high reputation score will provide safe files in high probability, thus every peer will select peer with High reputation score. Two types of reputation scores are; 1) Global score, 2) Local score.In all the transaction, peer receives a file to evaluate its reliability with help of local score. By aggregating local scores, every peer will share a unique global score. Then each peer refers to global score and selects the transacting peer whose global score is high. If peer foes not send a file to others then local score is not calculated. Also if global score of peer is not enough, then peer is not selected as uploader. The main purpose of DFR-TRUST model is to distribute the file requests among peers to provide safe file with high probability. In DFR-TRUST model, local score calculation will not depend on number of file providing and also will select middle evaluated peers. In P2Pnetwork, departure and participation of peers [3], [4], [5] occur frequently, thus the number of high evaluated safe peer's decreases with peer's departure.The purpose of NP-TRUST model is to distribute file requests among safe peers; this will include newly joined peers and initial peers. By giving chances new peers to be evaluated intentionally, file requests are distributed among all safe peers and new peers are utilized as up loader. By this way, NP-TRUST model avoids concentration of file requests on portion of safe peers.

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“…3 Invited residents were required to participate together with a friend. In total, we con-1 In Binzel and Fehr (2013) we examine how the social distance between players affects behavior in a binary trust game with hidden action. We use respondents' behavior in one of the two dictator games to control for other-regarding preferences, but do not analyze the data from the dictator games itself.…”

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After playing a binary trust game with hidden action (for details see Binzel and Fehr, 2013), participants played several variants of the dictator game, in which they were asked to allocate an endowment of 20 Egyptian Pound (L.E. )…”

Section: Experimental Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

Binzel

Fehr

2013

Economics Letters

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 7516 July 2013 ABSTRACTGiving and Sorting among Friends: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment * Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects -friend versus stranger -and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find -consistent with Leider et al. (2009) -that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual's intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. JEL Classification:C93, D64, L14, O12

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Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo

Cited by 92 publications

References 43 publications

Neighborhood effects and social behavior: The case of irrigated and rainfed farmers in Bohol, the Philippines

Neighborhood effects and social behavior: The case of irrigated and rainfed farmers in Bohol, the Philippines

A Reliable Peer-to-Peer Platform for Adding New Node Using Trust Based Model

Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

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