Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board

Blair, Margaret M.; Stout, Lynn A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.266622

Cited by 71 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…As professionals they will make some degree of personal sacrifice and act honestly and diligently and this is not to be seen as quirky behaviour (Blair and Stout, 2001a). They seek intrinsic rewards such as reciprocity and take satisfaction in seeing organisational success, rather than, as classically portrayed, endeavouring to obtain extrinsic rewards, which are primarily of an economic nature (Davis et al 1997a;Pastoriza and Arinio 2008;Tosi et al 2003).…”

Section: Stewardship Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

Keay

2017

IJLMA

101

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Purpose -the objective of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory.Design/methodology/approach -the paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory.Findings -While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory.Practical Implications -The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach Originality/value -while many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory and to establish that accountability is necessary.

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Section: Stewardship Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

Keay

2017

IJLMA

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…It would be surprising if proposals derived from an inadequate theory could lead to successful practical implications. The view of the firm as a nexus of firm specific investments (Zingales 1998, Blair andStout 2001) argues that it is not in the interest of the shareholders to be the only residual owners. Firms exist because they produce synergies or quasi-rents which cannot be obtained by the markets.…”

Section: Firm Specific Knowledge and Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance for knowledge production: Theoretical foundations and practical implications

Osterloh

Frey

2006

COC

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Agency Theory as the dominant view of Corporate Governance disregards that the key task of firm governance is to generate, accumulate, transfer, and protect firm specific knowledge. Three different foundations to the theory of the firm which underpin different concepts of corporate governance are discussed: The traditional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, the view of the firm as a nexus of firm specific investments and the view of the firm as a nexus of firm specific knowledge investments. The latter view distinguishes two fundamental differences between contracting firm specific knowledge investments in contrast to financial investment: (1) A knowledge worker cannot contract his or her future knowledge in the same way as the exchange of tangible goods; (2) Only insiders can evaluate firm specific knowledge generation and transformation. We suggest a concept of corporate governance that takes investments infirm specific knowledge into account: (1) The board should rely more on insiders; (2) Those employees of the firm making firm-specific knowledge investments should elect the insiders; (3) A neutral person should chair the board. This concept provides a theoretical foundation of corporate governance based in the knowledge-based theory of the firm.

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“…It has been argued that corporate performance based on ownership control and the supremacy of shareholders leads to stock market efficiency. However, other scholars argue the assumption about shareholder supremacy is not only flawed, but wrong (Blair, 1995;Blair and Stout, 2001;Grandori, 2004). They argue this assumption leads to negative and even disastrous consequences such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, etc (Ghoshal, 2005;Kochan, 2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Women and Employee-Elected Board Members, and Their Contributions to Board Control Tasks

2009

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We present results from a study about women and employee-elected board members, and fill some of the gaps in the literature about their contribution to board effectiveness. The empirical data is from a unique data set of Norwegian firms. Board effectiveness is evaluated in relation to board control tasks including board CSR involvement. We found that the contributions of women and employee-elected board members varied depending on the board tasks studied. In the article we also explored the effects of the esteem of the women and employee-elected board members, and we used creative discussions in the boardroom as a mediating variable. Previous board research, including research about women and employeeelected directors, questions if the board members contribute to board effectiveness. The main message from this study is that it may be more important to ask how, rather than if, women and employee-elected board members contribute, and we need to open the black box of actual board behavior to explore how they may contribute.

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Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board

Abstract: One of the most pressing questions facing both corporate scholars and businesspeople today is how corporate directors can be made accountable.

Cited by 71 publications

References 2 publications

Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

Corporate governance for knowledge production: Theoretical foundations and practical implications

Women and Employee-Elected Board Members, and Their Contributions to Board Control Tasks

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