Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens

Arsenault, Elizabeth Grimm; Bacon, Tricia

doi:10.1080/1057610x.2014.977605

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…In the literature, there are various studies related to their longevity and durability such as organizational cohesion (Perkoski, 2019), size of the group (Blomberg et al, 2011;Nawaz, 2017), the capability of leadership (Ibrahim Shire, 2020), having sanctuaries (Arsenault & Bacon, 2015), reliable resources (Berman et al, 2011;Farrell, 2018;Hazen, 2013;Ross, 2004), disseminating propaganda (Dahiru, 2021;Karakuş & Ak, 2022), operational capacity (Nawaz, 2017;Osasona, 2022), cooperation against the rival (Gravingholt et al, 2007) as well as legitimacy and recruitment. Research in this strand of literature especially highlights the last two factors having determinant effects in a tumultuous environment.…”

Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

Devlet Dişi Si̇lahli Gruplarin Mukavemet Strateji̇si̇: Defakto Yöneti̇mleri̇n Araçsallaştirilmasi

KARAKUŞ¹

2022

joh

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This article explains, among other crucial factors, how de-facto government structures can be used as a durability/resilience strategy by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs). In order to stay relevant, during and after the intrastate war, these groups seek to materialize various forms of policies, strategies, and operations. This study claims that in the shift to the re-territorialisation, armed groups that establish functional governance facilities are likely to live longer by providing essential needs of the civilians to garner popular support. In addition, it is claimed that by instrumentalizing this structure, armed groups also opt to show their political maturity, build reputation, change the third-party actors' attitudes and behaviors, and maintain relationships with their supporters. The study constructs a framework to better understand the socio-political governance system through a detailed case study analysis. The study compares the Syrian Salvation Government established by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria established by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) with Somaliland, one of Africa's long-lasting de-facto governments.

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Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

Devlet Dişi Si̇lahli Gruplarin Mukavemet Strateji̇si̇: Defakto Yöneti̇mleri̇n Araçsallaştirilmasi

KARAKUŞ¹

2022

joh

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“…Extending Elden's initial argument revels just how profoundly territorial non-state actors can be. For instance, consider the existence and importance of a safe haven which Arsenault and Bacon 45 define "as places in which terrorist groups can operate without fear of counterterror retaliation or pressure" and that can enable groups to fight longer and more successfully. Safe havens are then places within the territory of a state but where the power of the state cannot fully reach.…”

Section: Territory and Territorialitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Territorial Contours of Terrorism: A Conceptual Model of Territory for Non-state Violence

Pinos

Radil

2018

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Our article challenges a common discourse that terrorist groups are relatively disinterested in territory by exploring emerging theories about territory and territoriality. We use these theories to introduce a new conceptual model of the importance of territory for terrorism that contrasts a group's Sovereignty Claims over Territory (SCOT), which corresponds with the ultimate territorial aims of the group, with its Effective Control of Territory (ECOT), which relates to the ability of an organization to exert influence over a particular territory. Contrasting these dimensions of territory allows us to develop several archetypes of territorially-motivated terrorism. Our model predicts that, in contrast to common deterritorial discourses, truly nonterritorial terrorism is likely to be quite rare as most groups engaged in violence have territorial ambitions in one way or another. We then use our model to interrogate the salience of territory to three representative cases: the Islamic State, ETA, and FARC-EP. Our analysis shows that territory remains a central motivating factor for these groups as their overall territorial aims tend to remain constant whereas their ability to control territory is more susceptible to change. We conclude by discussing the implications of our model and analysis for future research.

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“…In Africa, recent research using exponential random graph models suggests that rebel groups whose turfs overlap are more likely to fight each other (Cunningham and Everton 2017). Space can also enable criminal and terrorist organisation to spread geographically by using border regions as sanctuaries (Arsenault and Bacon 2015), as in the Lake Chad region today (Walther et al, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncovering the internal structure of Boko Haram through its mobility patterns

2020

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Boko Haram has caused nearly 40,000 casualties in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, becoming one of the deadliest Jihadist organisations in recent history. At its current rate, Boko Haram takes part in more than two events each day, taking the lives of nearly 11 people daily. Yet, little is known concerning Boko Haram’s internal structure, organisation, and its mobility.Here, we propose a novel technique to uncover the internal structure of Boko Haram based on the sequence of events in which the terrorist group takes part. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) gives the location and time of nearly 3,800 events in which Boko Haram has been involved since the organisation became violent 10 years ago. Using this dataset, we build an algorithm to detect the fragmentation of Boko Haram into multiple cells, assuming that travel costs and reduced familiarity with unknown locations limit the mobility of individual cells.Our results suggest that the terrorist group has a very high level of fragmentation and consists of at least 50–60 separate cells. Our methodology enables us to detect periods of time during which Boko Haram exhibits exceptionally high levels of fragmentation, and identify a number of key routes frequently travelled by separate cells of Boko Haram where military interventions could be concentrated.

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Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Devlet Dişi Si̇lahli Gruplarin Mukavemet Strateji̇si̇: Defakto Yöneti̇mleri̇n Araçsallaştirilmasi

Devlet Dişi Si̇lahli Gruplarin Mukavemet Strateji̇si̇: Defakto Yöneti̇mleri̇n Araçsallaştirilmasi

The Territorial Contours of Terrorism: A Conceptual Model of Territory for Non-state Violence

Uncovering the internal structure of Boko Haram through its mobility patterns

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