Disagreement and the value of self-trust

Abstract

Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from the perspective of pure rationality. But their critics are right too, in seeing something undesirable in the consequences of giving equal weight. Among epistemologists, there is a tendency to set aside trust and other such non-epistemic factors, on the grounds that these are not germane to their topic. But ultimately, the value of self-trust shows signs of encroaching on the strictly epistemic question of when our beliefs may be said to be justified. Hence again, even if the equal-weighters are right about what is rational, they may be wrong about what knowledge requires.

Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements

“…Robert Pasnau (2015) pursues this strategy in support of Non-conformist intuitions. Like Schafer, he does not question the Conformist's claim that a disagreement with a peer gives you an epistemic reason to adjust your belief.…”

“…They have argued either that the view implies that it is less rational for you to consider others as peers than is generally assumed (Schafer 2015) or, when you are facing a doxastic disagreement with a peer, that it explains why there are less pressures to conciliate than Conformists claim (Wedgwood 2007(Wedgwood , 2010Enoch 2010;Pasnau 2015).…”

“…In those cases, the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with you gives you an epistemic reason to reconsider the trust you placed in yourself in forming this belief and to adjust your original belief. Pace Pasnau (2015), epistemic self-trust does not license you to remain steadfast in those cases; it is what comes under pressure in at least some disagreements with an epistemic peer.…”

Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice

“…Second, even in such a case, capitulation may not be required, and also for reasons accessible from the subject's point of view. Robert Pasnau, addressing the literature on epistemic peer disagreement, has recently argued that self-trust is something intrinsically valuable that stands over against epistemic rationality (which is also intrinsically valuable on his view) (Pasnau 2015). Pasnau argues that if epistemic rationality were the only thing agents were concerned about, then some form of conciliationism would seem like the best response to epistemic peer disagreement across the board.…”

The Topology of Communities of Trust

“…For example, Pasnau (2015) argues that self-trust justifiably influences how we should react to peer disagreement. Lehrer (1997) argues that self-trust grounds reason, wisdom, and knowledge.…”