Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94

Abstract

This article examines how party discipline and legislators' individual policy goals induced by electoral rules influence the likelihood of defections from the party line in the Bundestag. Using a new indicator based on legislators' explanations of their voting behaviour we find strong evidence that discipline, not policy cohesiveness alone, drives party unity. In particular, the allocation of offices by the party leadership significantly affects legislators' propensity to defect from the position of their party. First, holding an executive office reduces legislators' probability to defect by approximately 19 per cent. Second, parliamentary office also reduces legislators' probability to defect, although the effect is smaller. District legislators are not generally more prone to defect, but their propensity to defect increases if electoral competition increases.

Using MP statements to explain voting behaviour in the German Bundestag

“…First, the analysis of this article should be extended over time to see whether the results, especially on the unexpected differences between the two cabinet parties, are caused by the special conditions of the Grand Coalition cabinet or reflect systematic variation between the party holding the chancellorship and junior coalition partners. Comparing the results in this article with earlier findings (Becher and Sieberer, 2008) leads me to expect that the effects of government status and leadership positions hold over time, while the electoral system effect may vary. Second, future analyses could study the arguments used in EoVs searching for references to competing principals and the strategies MPs use to balance between contradictory demands in their pursuit of re-election and career advancement.…”

“…Recently, EoVs were used to test whether defecting votes can be tied to district concerns (Sieberer, 2010). The only systematic study focusing directly on EoVs shows that both belonging to a government party and holding offices in the cabinet and parliament significantly decrease the probability that individual MPs declare defection from the party line (Becher and Sieberer, 2008 (2) what positions do they take vis-à-vis the party line? My explanation for the use of the instrument starts from the assumption that MPs' voting behaviour reflects the wishes of their most important principal.…”

The electoral connection of ministerial selection in the UK

“…As a result, according to the main argument of this line of study, ministers are more likely to be among those MPs who share the preferences of the leadership or the collective ideals of the party as a whole. Likewise, empirical studies show that there is a strong positive relationship between voting with the party and the prospects of acquiring a higher office for parliamentarians (Becher & Sieberer, 2008;Jun & Hix, 2010;Kam, 2009). Checking the assumption from the other way around, Benedetto and Hix (2007) also find similar evidence among those parliamentarians whose progressive ambitions are frustrated by lack of appointment or those who were once office holders but were then sacked.…”

“…At this stage, it is argued, 'the main matter which is left undecided after the voters' choice is the nomination of individuals to specific ministerial post or responsibilities' (De Winter, 1995, p. 117). Understanding the ministerial selection as a rational choice of the leader, empirical studies show that personal attributes (Alderman & Cross, 1986;Buck, 1963;Heppell, 2012;King, 1981;Macdonald, 1987;Rose, 1971;Willson, 1959), party loyalty (Becher & Sieberer, 2008;Jun & Hix, 2010;Kam, 2009), and policy preferences (Kam, Bianco, Sened, & Smyth, 2010) of candidates are the determinants of ministerial selection.…”

Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?

“…Directly elected MPs in the 2005-2009 period were more likely to defect than list MPs; the likelihood of defection decreased with higher vote margins of direct MPs (Neuhäuser et al 2013, Sieberer 2010. Becher and Sieberer (2008), however, do not find that direct MPs are more prone than list MPs to defect during the period [1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994]; the likelihood to defect however increased if electoral competition increased, and executive offices and party affiliation explain patterns of defection in roll-call votes. 4 Another pertinent question is how voters react to MPs voting against the party line.…”