Using MP statements to explain voting behaviour in the German Bundestag

Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intraparty Dissent in Parliaments

“…In fact, little is known about how voters react to different explanations of rebellion by MPs, to the responses of the leadership, and whether their reactions vary across contexts and countries. Several researchers have looked at official "explanations of votes" in the German Bundestag (Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou 2019;Sieberer 2015;Zittel and Nyhuis 2019). These explanations are included in the plenary protocol when MPs cast a vote that runs contrary to the perceived wishes of their voters or dissents from the party line.…”

Restrictive rules of speechmaking as a tool to maintain party unity: The case of oppressed political conflict in German parliament debates on the euro crisis

“…The usage of EoVs has gradually increased (Schindler, 1999: 1790–1791). In the legislative period between 2005 and 2009, MPs made use of this communication channel in 2.1% of possible occasions (Sieberer, 2015: 289). For roll-call votes on the euro crisis, Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou (2019) find much higher activity, as between 3.2 and 21.7% of German legislators issued an individual EoV or signed a joint one.…”

“…They can be given orally for a maximum of 5 min before the vote is taken. Conventionally, however, MPs choose to deliver these expressions in writing either individually or jointly with party colleagues to (a) demonstrate party loyalty and confirm the party line, (b) voice reservations despite voting with the party, or (c) explain why they defected in the vote (Becher and Sieberer, 2008;Sieberer, 2015). The usage of EoVs has gradually increased (Schindler, 1999(Schindler, : 1790(Schindler, -1791.…”

When the Worlds of Preferences Collide: Determinants of MP’s Attitudes on the Italian Questione Romana 1861–1870

“…Proksch and Slapin (2015) show how party discipline profoundly affects not only the positions MPs take in their speeches, but also the floor time allocated in parliament to party's member. Similarly, Sieberer (2015) argues that party unity and discipline present politicians with incentives not to deviate from the party line, whereas Cordero and Coller (2015) demonstrate that parties with different candidate selection procedures shape members' preferences with different intensities. Regarding the impact of voters on politicians' preferences, academic literature is similarly rich, with contributions on how electoral systems affect politicians' positioning with respect to voters' preferences (Ferland 2018;Martin and Hug 2018), and how MPs react to changes in the number and characteristics of voters, as after an enlargement of the suffrage (Spirling 2016).…”