Disclaiming epistemic access with ‘know’ and ‘remember’ in Finnish

Resisting an action in conversation by pointing out epistemic incongruence: Mä tiedän ‘I know’ responses in Finnish

“…Utterances concerning lack of knowledge are shown to be used for various purposes such as hedging (see Keevallik, 2011;Weatherall, 2011;Laury & Helasvuo, 2016 and other articles in the same special issue), but fewer studies focus on utterances that claim knowledge. However, the Estonian ma tean, 'I know' and its emergence as an epistemic adverb has been examined (Keevallik, 2010), but in that data, the object of knowing occurs in the speaker's own turn.…”

Peer talk in collaborative writing of primary school students: A conversation analytic study of student interaction in the context of inquiry learning

“…When students write down new content, one participant is writing while the others are closely monitoring how this is done and provide unsolicited spelling instructions. Giving instructions to a peer, violates the principles of epistemic congruency and recipient design (Laury & Helasvuo, 2016), since a lack of knowledge of the recipient is presumed (which is a face-threatening context). Similar to what Mikesell, et al (2017) demonstrated in their study, these 'I know'-responses acknowledge the accuracy of the action, but resist the authoritative stance of the co-participant.…”

“…In Goffman (1967), he explained how participants do interactional work to maintain 'face': their own face (self-respect) and the face of others (considerateness). Conversational partners are not only attentive to each other's face, but also to the distribution of knowledge among their addressees, and they tailor their utterances accordingly (Laury & Helasvuo, 2016). Stivers et al (2011) clarify how this is done in terms of alignment, cooperative responses that facilitate the proposed activity or sequence, matching the formal design preference of the turn, and affiliation, responses that cooperate at the level of action and affective stance.…”

“…Having and sharing knowledge in interaction, has moral dimensions in terms of rights and responsibilities (Stivers et al, 2011). Conversational partners are expected to be attentive to the distribution of knowledge among their addressees, and tailor their utterances accordingly (Laury & Helasvuo, 2016), in terms of alignment and affiliation (Stivers et al, 2011). CA studies on the use of 'I know' and 'you know' have established the conversational functions of these utterances, among which resisting the news value of what is being said, indicating a general agreement or understanding on the basis of prior knowledge, affiliating with co-participants, and appealing to the recipients' knowledge and involvement (Asmuβ, 2011;Keevallik, 2003;MacMartin, et al, 2014;Mikesell, et al, 2017;Keevallik, 2003).…”

“…Het hebben en delen van kennis in interactie heeft morele dimensies die te maken hebben met rechten en verantwoordelijkheden (Stivers et al, 2011). Gesprekspartners verwachten onderling dat uitingen worden afgestemd op wat de ander wel of niet weet (Laury & Helasvuo, 2016). CA-studies naar het gebruik van 'ik weet' en 'jij weet' in gesprekken tussen volwassenen hebben de gespreksfuncties van deze uitingen laten zien en hoe dergelijke uitingen appelleren aan de kennis en (emotionele) betrokkenheid van de participanten (Asmuβ, 2011;Heritage, 2012a,b;Keevallik, 2003;MacMartin, et al, 2014;Mikesell, et al, 2017;Keevallik, 2003).…”