Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes

Sun, Monic

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1304788

Cited by 43 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Anand and Shachar (2005) consider the role of advertising in a¤ecting a consumer's beliefs about match quality both theoretically and empirically. Sun (2007) examines how the extent of (known) vertical quality a¤ects a …rm's decision to release information about horizontal attributes. Finally, in related work, Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2008) explore a multidimensional good setting in which consumers also gather information, but do so attribute by attribute.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Gathering and Marketing

2008

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Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can choose to acquire more detailed information. A …rm can make it easier or harder for these consumers to obtain such information. We explore consumers'information gathering and the …rm's integrated strategy for marketing, pricing, and investment in quality. In particular, we highlight that when consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous, the …rm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite di¤erent reasons. First, it serves as a non-price means of discrimination-it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the …rm cannot commit to a given investment in quality, it can still convince all consumers of its provision by designing a pricing and marketing policy that induces some consumers to actively gather further information. This mass of consumers, in exchange, is su¢ ciently large to discipline the monopolist to invest in the quality of the product.JEL: D42, D83, L15, M31

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Gathering and Marketing

2008

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“…This gives an incentive to conceal "dramatic" news (i.e., extremely low and high costs), while sharing "anticipated" news. Recently, a few other papers analyze different economic problems with non-monotonic disclosure incentives (e.g., Board, 2009, Sun, 2011, and Jansen, 2010. Board (2009) and Sun (2011) study the incentives of firms to disclose information about their product characteristics to consumers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, a few other papers analyze different economic problems with non-monotonic disclosure incentives (e.g., Board, 2009, Sun, 2011, and Jansen, 2010. Board (2009) and Sun (2011) study the incentives of firms to disclose information about their product characteristics to consumers. By contrast, I analyze a model in which firms disclose information about their technology to each other, not to a third party.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights

Jansen

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…So, full disclosure arises as the unique equilibrium outcome. In a related paper, Sun (2007) finds that full disclosure may fail when both horizontal and vertical differentiation are present. In this case, the seller of a not-so-popular brand may conceal information in order to be pooled with the sellers of other not-so-popular brands on the other side of the product space.…”

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confidence: 98%

Monopoly Provision of Tune-Ins

Celik

2008

SSRN Journal

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This paper analyzes a single television station's choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. The TV station may air a fully informative tune-in during the first program. The cost of the tune-in is the forgone advertising revenue. The viewers may learn the later program through a tune-in, if any, if they watch the earlier program, or by directly sampling it for a few minutes. Under mild conditions, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some viewers watch the first program just to see if there is a tune-in or not, and the TV station airs a tune-in unless the two programs are too dissimilar. In the absence of a tune-in, no viewer within the first-period audience keeps watching TV. Full information disclosure never arises. The market outcome is suboptimal; a social planner would air a tune-in for a wider range of programs. When the programs are also quality-differentiated, the willingness to air a tune-in, and thus to disclose location information, may be sufficient to signal high quality without any dissipative advertising.

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Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes

Cited by 43 publications

References 36 publications

Information Gathering and Marketing

Information Gathering and Marketing

Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights

Monopoly Provision of Tune-Ins

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