Disclosure and Corruption

Abstract

Disclosure laws require individuals and organizations that spend money on political speech to make public their identities. The Supreme Court and many others laud disclosure for shining light on money in politics and combating quid pro quo corruption. But that support may be misplaced. While disclosure provides information to law enforcement and the general public, it also provides information to corrupt actors. Disclosure records can tell politicians which private actors support compliant candidates, and the records can help private actors determine which politicians reward their benefactors. Disclosure can thus bring conspirators together and reduce the uncertainty that inheres in illegal transactions. That means disclosure has crosscutting effects. It can deter corruption by increasing the likelihood of exposure, but it can also raise the benefit of corruption by increasing the certainty that parties to corrupt deals will keep their promises. When the second effect trumps, disclosure increases corruption. This analysis has implications for scholarship and law. It suggests that policymakers and judges should be less optimistic about disclosure and open to alternative corruption-fighting measures.

Simulated Complexity: A New Classroom Simulation to Teach about Campaign-Finance Laws

“…A longer simulation would allow for the inclusion of a voter element such that hypothesized benefits of disclosure could be measured and discussed with students, particularly in relation to the types of costs discussed previously. It also could make possible original research to contribute additional findings to a current and important discussion/debate about disclosure requirements (Carpenter et al 2014; Carpenter and Milyo 2012–2013; Gilbert and Aiken 2015; Mayer 2014; Wood and Spencer 2016).…”

The Democratic Enhancement Fund: A Possible Response to Corruption and Inadequate Public Funding

“…While this can cause a corresponding decrease in corruption risk, it could also increase corruption risk by making politicians more dependent on the remaining large contributors (Ewing and Ghaleigh 2007). Further, providing the public with information about the financial interests supporting a candidate may help contributors identify which candidates are most likely to accept bribes or acquiesce to their wishes (Gilbert and Aiken 2015).…”

Campaign Finance Disclosure

“…We have an incomplete picture of the costs and benefits of campaign finance disclosures, and many of our theories fail to contemplate offsetting effects (cf. Gilbert & Aiken 2015;Gilbert 2013) and moderating effects that scholars studying disclosure in other contexts have learned about for decades.…”

“…Some scholars have argued that disclosure can actually facilitate corrupt exchanges. Gilbert & Aiken (2015) argue that disclosure has crosscutting effects, reducing corruption under some conditions but increasing corruption when it allows conspirators to more easily identify and rely on each other. In their call for unverifiable, secret donations, Ackerman & Ayres (2002) argue that even under full disclosure, politicians have the same incentives to accept large amounts of money, and that it is difficult to prove corruption that can result from large donations in court.…”