Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts

İnşacılık, Kimlik, ‘Üretilmiş’ Vatandaşlar: Rusya’nın Abhazya ve Güney Osetya’da Vatandaşlık Politikaları

“…Bolşevik Devrimi sonrasında bağımsız Gürcistan'ın (1918)(1919)(1920)(1921) güneyinin kalkınmasıyla ilgili toplantı için Soçi'ye davet edilmesi 54 gibi gelişmelerle teyit edildiğini aktarmak yeterli olacaktır. Rusya'nın Abhaz ve Osetlere vatandaşlık vermeye başlamasında, bu altyapı işlevsel olmuş, yerleşik kimlik algılarının pekişmesi sürecine girilmiştir.…”

Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War

“…The capacity of the Georgian forces was evident earlier in July 1989, when Georgians from Abkhazia and Georgia clashed with the Abkhaz in the capital Sukhum/i 7 . The violence stopped only after Soviet troops intervened, an investigation into the clashes was launched in Georgia, and participating Abkhaz officials were removed from office (Hewitt 2013, 85). Despite this precedent, the Abkhaz did not expect war to break out and were unprepared for the advance of the Georgian forces in August, 1992.…”

“… 4 Scholars have identified historical (Anchabadze 1998; Lakoba 2004; Papaskiri 2010), political (Coppieters 1996; Cornell 2000; Nodia and Scholtbach 2006), economic (Zürcher, Baev, and Koehlet 2005), social (Derluguian 2005; Hewitt 2013), and external (Baev 1997; Lynch 2000) roots of the conflict. …”

“… 36 For example, on July 23, 1992, Abkhazia's non-Georgian leadership, in the absence of Georgian officials, reinstated the 1925 Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution, which declared Abkhazia “as independent but ‘united with the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia on the basis of a special union treaty’” (Cornell 2000, 158; see also Hewitt 2013; Nodia and Scholtbach 2006). …”

Go West: Georgia's European identity and its role in domestic politics and foreign policy objectives

“…In the process, Georgia had lost three of its regions. Abkhazia and South Ossetia won de facto independence by force of arms (see Companjen and Polese 2012;6 Beachain 2012;Hewitt 2013), with Russian support, while Adjara became the private fiefdom of local strongman Aslan Abashidze who paid neither taxes nor homage to the state authorities in Tbilisi. To its supporters, the Rose Revolution of 2003 represented a desperate attempt to reverse this decade of decline and to re-chart Georgia's destiny so that a strong state, protecting democratic and liberal values, might win back the lost territories and restore Georgian national pride and confidence (6 Beachain 2009).…”