Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values

Christensen-Szalanski, Jay

doi:10.1177/0272989x8400400108

Cited by 191 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Consistent with prior work (Read & Loewenstein, 1999;Christensen-Szalanski, 1984), we expect renters in our sample to mispredict affective experiences. Specifically, we expect renters to be surprised by the negative affect they experience when they actually pay a fine.…”

Section: The Present Researchsupporting

confidence: 84%

The Impact of Personal Experience on Behavior: Evidence from Video-Rental Fines

et al. 2012

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Personal experience matters. In a field setting with longitudinal data, we disentangle the effects of learning new information from the effects of personal experience. We demonstrate that experience with a fine, controlling for the effect of learning new information, significantly boosts future compliance. We also show that experience with a large fine boosts compliance more than experience with a small fine, but that the influence of experience with both large and small fines decays sharply over time.

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Section: The Present Researchsupporting

confidence: 84%

The Impact of Personal Experience on Behavior: Evidence from Video-Rental Fines

et al. 2012

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“…23 26 Whether the average individual is capable of making health decisions concerning outcomes of which he/she has little or no experience is questionable, especially when patients can choose to delegate responsibility to the appropriate informed healthcare professional. This might suggest that healthcare decisions should be wholly the responsibility of the experts.…”

Section: Discounting Healthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating implied rates of discount in healthcare decision-making

West

McNabb²,

Thompson³

et al. 2003

Health Technol Assess

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Non-UK purchasers will have to pay a small fee for post and packing. For European countries the cost is £2 per monograph and for the rest of the world £3 per monograph.You can order HTA monographs from our Despatch Agents:-fax (with credit card or official purchase order) -post (with credit card or official purchase order or cheque) -phone during office hours (credit card only).Additionally the HTA website allows you either to pay securely by credit card or to print out your order and then post or fax it. Contact details are as follows: Payment methods Paying by chequeIf you pay by cheque, the cheque must be in pounds sterling, made payable to Direct Mail Works Ltd and drawn on a bank with a UK address. Paying by credit cardThe following cards are accepted by phone, fax, post or via the website ordering pages: Delta, Eurocard, Mastercard, Solo, Switch and Visa. We advise against sending credit card details in a plain email. Paying by official purchase orderYou can post or fax these, but they must be from public bodies (i.e. NHS or universities) within the UK. We cannot at present accept purchase orders from commercial companies or from outside the UK. How do I get a copy of HTA on CD?Please use the form on the HTA website (www.hta.ac.uk/htacd.htm). Or contact Direct Mail Works (see contact details above) by email, post, fax or phone. HTA on CD is currently free of charge worldwide.The website also provides information about the HTA Programme and lists the membership of the various committees. The editors and publisher have tried to ensure the accuracy of this report but do not accept liability for damages or losses arising from material published in this report. They would like to thank the referees for their constructive comments on the draft document. HTA ISSN 1366-5278 © Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2003This monograph may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and may be included in professional journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising.Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to HMSO,The Copyright Unit, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich, NR3 1BQ.Published by Gray Publishing, Tunbridge Wells, Kent, on behalf of NCCHTA.Printed on acid-free paper in the UK by St Edmundsbury Press Ltd, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk. Criteria for inclusion in the HTA monograph seriesReports are published in the HTA monograph series if (1) they have resulted from work commissioned for the HTA Programme, and (2) they are of a sufficiently high scientific quality as assessed by the referees and editors.Reviews in Health Technology Assessment are termed 'systematic' when the account of the search, appraisal and synthesis methods (to minimise biases and random errors) would, in theory, permit the replication of the review by others. M Objectives:To consider whether implied rates of discounting from the perspectives of individual and society differ, and whether implied rates of discounting in ...

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“…tions shifts preference from the smaller, sooner outcome to the larger, later outcome (Christensen-Szalanski, 1984;Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994;Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995). For example, suppose someone preferred to receive $10 in 2 weeks, rather than $20 in 4 weeks.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A specific case of the common ratio effect is the certainty effect, where the smaller, more probable option in the first choice is certain. For example (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984, someone might prefer $30 for sure to an 80% chance of $45 but also might prefer a 20% chance of $45 to a 25% chance of $30. The common ratio effect can be characterized by more risk-seeking preferences for small probabilities to win than for large probabilities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision biases in intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty: Testing a common account

Chapman

Weber

2006

Memory & Cognition

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Some decisions involve uncertain outcomes. For example, selecting an entrée at a restaurant entails uncertainty about how delicious each menu option would be. Other decisions involve delayed outcomes. For example, initiating an exercise program entails a delay until the positive results of exercise are observed. Both decision making under uncertainty and intertemporal choice have been the topic of much research. In the present article, we analyze potential parallels between these two types of choices.Decision making under uncertainty can be characterized by risk preferences. A preference for a lottery over its expected value (EV) (e.g., preferring a 50% chance of $10 over $5 for sure) is considered risk seeking, whereas a preference for the expected value over the lottery (e.g., preferring the $5 for sure) is known as risk aversion. Intertemporal choice can be characterized by time preferences. A preference for a positive outcome now rather than for an equivalent outcome later (e.g., preferring $10 now to $10 in 1 month) is called a positive time preference, and the extent of the time preference can be quantified as a discount rate, or the percentage of increase in the magnitude of the payout needed to offset a delay. For example, a 20% monthly discount rate would mean that $10 now is equally preferable to $12 in 1 month (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2003).There are apparent parallels between choice under uncertainty and intertemporal choice-that is, seemingly analogous phenomena that could be explained if risk preferences and time preferences are driven by common factors (see Green & Myerson, 2004). A number of researchers have suggested that time and delay are parallel (e.g., Keren & Roelofsma, 1995;Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986) or have analogous effects on choice (Chapman, 1997;Gafni & Torrance, 1984;Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003).The study of both choice under uncertainty and intertemporal choice has centered around the analysis of decision biases, or deviations from normative theory. Risky choice biases are deviations from expected utility theory (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Intertemporal choice biases are deviations from discounted utility theory (Koopsman, 1960). Prelec and Loewenstein (1991;Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) noted that some risky choice biases parallel intertemporal choice biases.The purpose of the present experiments was to provide an empirical test of a particular account of the apparent parallels between biases in risky choice and biases in intertemporal choice. That is, we tested the idea that biases in the two domains that appear similar are the result of the same underlying mechanism. We first will describe two pairs of biases; we then will present a psychophysical account for parallels between the biases and, finally, an empirical test devised to evaluate this account. Pairs of Parallel BiasesCommon difference and common ratio effects. The common difference effect is a bias in intertemporal choice in which adding a constant delay to both choice op- Two...

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Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values

Cited by 191 publications

References 14 publications

The Impact of Personal Experience on Behavior: Evidence from Video-Rental Fines

The Impact of Personal Experience on Behavior: Evidence from Video-Rental Fines

Estimating implied rates of discount in healthcare decision-making

Decision biases in intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty: Testing a common account

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