Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups

Abstract

Why do some ethnic groups in conflict (those that are mobilized or face discrimination) receive more external support than others do? This is an important question that has been overlooked despite the crucial role international support has played. Which characteristics of groups and their host states cause them to receive more support? I consider three explanations. First, separatist groups are less likely to receive support owing to their threat to regional stability and international norms. This argument is derived from accounts focusing on the inhibiting impact of vulnerability upon the foreign policies of African states. Second, groups in stronger states are more likely to receive support as states try to weaken their most threatening adversaries – an application of realist logic. Third, groups with ethnic ties to actors in positions of power elsewhere are more likely to receive external assistance. Using Minorities at Risk data, analyses focusing on the number of states supporting particular groups and the intensity of this support suggest that ethnic ties influence the international relations of ethnic conflict more than vulnerability and relative power. Further analyses contrast the international relations of peaceful ethnic disputes and violent ethnic conflicts. These analyses reveal that some factors (such as regime type, nearby separatism) increase breadth and/or intensity of support for groups that are not engaged in violence, while other variables (separatism of the group in question, relative power of host) influence the international relations of violent conflicts. The article concludes with implications for policy and future research.

Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting

“…Several studies have emphasized the salience of bonds between transnational groups in predicting intervention (Carment & James, 2004;Carment, James & Taydas, 2006;Saideman, 2001Saideman, , 2002 or as a trigger of international dispute (Carment & James, 1997;Davis, Jaggers & Moore, 1997;Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006;Moore & Davis, 1998;Trumbore, 2003). There are also studies that discuss the role of kin groups for contagion of internal ethnic conflict (see, for example, Lake & Rothchild, 1998); indeed, Buhaug & Gleditsch (2005) call attention to the need for examining this link more thoroughly.…”

Unwelcome Neighbors: Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict During the Cold War

“…The act of supporting secessionist movements itself, however, pays political dividends to ethnic constituents at home, while opening the possibility that a successful secessionist effort will lead to the future establishment of an independent state willing to voluntarily merge with the ''homeland'' (i.e., a more international acceptable route to irredentism). Saideman (2001Saideman ( , 2002a finds strong evidence that, at least during the nineties, ethnic ties indeed played a definitive role in decisions by states to support secessionist movements abroad.…”

“…destabilization of a potentially hostile neighbor. Several studies have investigated how territorial disputes (Kocs, 1995;Vasquez, 1995;Forsberg, 1996;Diehl, 1999;Zacher, 2001) and interstate ethnic ties (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997;James, 1997a, 1997b;Davis, Jaggers, and Moore, 1997;Rothchild, 1998a, 1998b;Saideman, 2001Saideman, , 2002a have impacted international relations. Building on earlier approaches, this study comprehensively links the study of territoriality with the question of ethnicity and analyzes how both interact to influence international relations.…”

Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease?

“…Majorities in one state that are ethnically similar to another are likely to intervene on behalf of those minorities due to those ethnic affinities James, 1996, 2000;Saidman, 1997). This argument is confirmed by empirical evidence 6 Davis, Jaggers, and Moore, 1997;Saidman, 2002). However, these studies also do not directly address religion.…”