Discursive justification and skepticism

Gerken, Mikkel

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0

Cited by 36 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…However, the proposal is characterized by the fact that its key notion of rational credibility appears to be binary . A gradable epistemic property is required to capture the idea that a subject's context determines the strength of the epistemic requirement on action (Brown ; Gerken , ).…”

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Gerken

2013

European J of Philosophy

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Knowledge norms of action are sometimes said to be motivated by the fact that they align with natural assessments of action in ordinary language. Competent and rational speakers normally use 'knowledge' and its cognates when they assess action. In contrast, competing accounts in terms of evidence, warrant or reliability do not straightforwardly align with ordinary language assessments of action. In response to this line of reasoning, I argue that a warrant account of action may explain the prominence of 'knowledge' in epistemic assessments better than the knowledge account. If this explanation is successful, it undermines a central rationale for the 'knowledge first' program in epistemology. Moreover, the explanation provides an insight into the social functions of knowledge ascriptions as well as a methodological lesson about the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing.

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Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Gerken

2013

European J of Philosophy

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“…Roughly, S meets the articulatability constraint to the extent that she is not merely able to conceive of the factors that are epistemically relevant to the belief that p but also able to linguistically articulate them as epistemic reasons. I will say that she may be ascribed discursive justification to the extent she meets the articulatability constraint (for a development of these notions, see Gerken Ms).…”

Section: Developing Testimonial Entitlement and Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Gerken¹

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Epistemic norms of assertion state that sincere assertion is appropriate only when the asserter possesses certain epistemic goods. Although the exact nature of these epistemic goods is disputed, it is variously held to be a state of knowledge (DeRose 2002;Fricker 2006;Hawthorne 2004;Stanley 2005;Unger 1975;Williamson 2000), justied belief (Douven 2006;Gerken 2012;Kvanvig 2009;Lackey 2007) or the truth (Weiner 2005). Goldberg's argument is this.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimonial Entitlement, Norms of Assertion and Privacy

Nickel¹

2013

Episteme

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According to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a falsehood but unintended hearers do not, and the phenomenon that the addressee may deflect challenges to his testimonial belief to the speaker but unintended hearers may not. Here I argue that we can do a better job explaining the normative statuses associated with testimony by reference to epistemic norms of assertion and privacy norms. Following Sanford Goldberg, I argue that epistemic norms of assertion, according to which sincere assertion is appropriate only when the asserter possesses certain epistemic goods, can be ‘put to work’ to explain the normative statuses associated with testimony. When these norms are violated, they give hearers the right to blame the speaker, and they also explain why the speaker takes responsibility for the justification of the statement asserted. Norms of privacy, on the other hand, directly exclude eavesdroppers and bystanders from an informational exchange, implying that they have no standing to do many of the things, such as issue challenges or questions to the speaker, that would be normal for conversational participants. This explains asymmetries of normative status associated with testimony in a way logically independent of speaker assurance.

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Discursive justification and skepticism

Cited by 36 publications

References 30 publications

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Testimonial Entitlement, Norms of Assertion and Privacy

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