Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Gerken, Mikkel

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00532.x

Cited by 35 publications

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“…To capture this idea, I adopt Burge's term ‘warrant’ as denoting a genus under which an internalist species, justification and its externalist counterpart, entitlement, are subsumable (Burge ; Gerken , forthcoming). Both warrant and its species are non‐factive gradable epistemic properties.…”

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various alternatives have been proposed (Brown 2008;Douven 2006;Gerken 2011;Kvanvig 2009;Rysiew , 2007. Alternative accounts have often concerned assertion, as Douven's rational credibility rule exemplifies (Douven 2006: 449).…”

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the proposal is characterized by the fact that its key notion of rational credibility appears to be binary. 7 A gradable epistemic property is required to capture the idea that a subject's context determines the strength of the epistemic requirement on action (Brown 2008;Gerken 2011Gerken , 2012c.…”

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned, the special case of assertive speech acts is trickier. Perhaps the kind , as opposed to mere degree, of warrant S needs to have in order to assert involves special (epistemically internalist) constraints (Gerken , forthcoming). …”

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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Gerken

2013

European J of Philosophy

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Knowledge norms of action are sometimes said to be motivated by the fact that they align with natural assessments of action in ordinary language. Competent and rational speakers normally use 'knowledge' and its cognates when they assess action. In contrast, competing accounts in terms of evidence, warrant or reliability do not straightforwardly align with ordinary language assessments of action. In response to this line of reasoning, I argue that a warrant account of action may explain the prominence of 'knowledge' in epistemic assessments better than the knowledge account. If this explanation is successful, it undermines a central rationale for the 'knowledge first' program in epistemology. Moreover, the explanation provides an insight into the social functions of knowledge ascriptions as well as a methodological lesson about the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing.

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Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Knowledge Norm and Its Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Gerken

2013

European J of Philosophy

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“…Thanks to a referee for Erkenntnis for impressing upon me the importance of qualifying the view in this way. 4 The use of this terminology begins with Burge 1993;2003, andcontinues, among other places, with Graham 2011, and specifically in the epistemology of testimony with Gerken 2013. cognitive access to reasons or grounds for one's belief, whereas entitlement attaches to a belief in virtue of the belief being reliably formed in the subject's normal environment. There are plenty of in-house disputes among pluralists, of course, including how the notion of an epistemically normal environment is to be understood.…”

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Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux

Madison

2015

Erkenn

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Abstract:In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual's justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer's justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker's testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker's testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples (Wright, 2015).So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony.

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Introduction

Coliva¹,

Pedersen²

2017

Epistemic Pluralism

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Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Cited by 35 publications

References 26 publications

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment

Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux

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