Dispositionalism and the Metaphysics of Science

Dumsday, Travis

doi:10.1017/9781108647502

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 279 publications

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“…I must confess that I have a hard time thinking of any example, within the powers literature, of somebody who takes the laws themselves to be powerful, as opposed to the properties themselves. The discussion among friends of powers is often whether we need laws at all (Mumford 2004, Bird 2007, Dumsday 2019). I will adapt Friebe's argument to be targeted at ontologies of powerful properties, rather than powerful laws.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Powers, Processes, and Time

Giannini¹

2021

Erkenn

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In this paper I argue that even the most radical metaphysics of powers (such as that adopted by Mumford & Anjum, Cartwright, or Groff) are compatible with eternalism. I first offer a taxonomy of powers ontologies, and attempt to characterise the difference between moderate and radical powers ontologies-the latter are characterised by an emphasis on production and dynamicity. I consider an argument by C. Friebe to the effect that the productive character of powers is inconsistent with Eternalism and find it wanting. I then elucidate the notion of dynamicity that radical powers theorists employ by making apparent their link with an ontology of irreducible processes. Finally, I respond to an argument by Donatella Donati to the effect that eternalism entails a reductive account of change which is inconsistent with process ontologies, and show that the the two are compatible. I conclude that we have no reason to think that radical powers metaphysics (and, a fortiori, every powers ontology) are not compatible with eternalism. A broadly Neo-Humean conception of the world, paradigmatically embodied by Lewis' claim that 'all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another' (Lewis 1986: ix) has been, at least implicitly, the background world-view of most metaphysical theorising in the last decades of the twentieth century. Recently, however, this paradigm is being put 'under serious pressure within analytic metaphysics' (Groff & Greco, 2013: 1) by a rival, broadly Neo-Aristotelian picture of reality, spearheaded by the idea that there are real causal powers that establish necessary connections between existents. i

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Powers, Processes, and Time

Giannini¹

2021

Erkenn

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“…1 What I call 'radical dispositionalism' is also known in scholarship as 'dispositional monism' (Barker, 2009), 'power structuralism' (Marmodoro, 2019), 'ontic structural realism' (Ladyman & Ross, 2007), or simply 'dispositionalism' (Dumsday, 2019). In my paper, I shall refer to the radical position as 'pure powers view', while the term 'dispositionalism' will be used to indicate general theory which subsumes both the radical and the moderate brands.…”

Section: H H Mørch's Defence Of Panpsychismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism

Dondoni

2021

Philosophia

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One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.

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“…Indeed, many proponents of Natural Kind Essentialism treat kinds as being more fundamental than the properties that characterize them Fundamentalist Natural Kind Essentialism : Natural kinds are prior to properties, and the latter are abstracted from natural kinds (Dumsday, 2019; Ellis, 2001; Lowe, 1989, 2006; Oderberg, 2007; Tahko, 2015). On this view, a lot is built into the nature of natural kinds.…”

Section: Varieties Of Non‐humeanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fundamentalist Natural Kind Essentialism : Natural kinds are prior to properties, and the latter are abstracted from natural kinds (Dumsday, 2019; Ellis, 2001; Lowe, 1989, 2006; Oderberg, 2007; Tahko, 2015).…”

Section: Varieties Of Non‐humeanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐Humeantheories of natural necessity

Hildebrand

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Non-Humean theories of natural necessity invoke modallyladen primitives to explain why nature exhibits lawlike regularities. However, they vary in the primitives they posit and in their subsequent accounts of laws of nature and related phenomena (including natural properties, natural kinds, causation, counterfactuals, and the like). This article provides a taxonomy of non-Humean theories, discusses influential arguments for and against them, and describes some ways in which differences in goals and methods can motivate different versions of non-Humeanism (and, for that matter, Humeanism). In short, this article provides an introduction to non-Humeanism concerning the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural necessity.

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Dispositionalism and the Metaphysics of Science

Cited by 17 publications

References 279 publications

Powers, Processes, and Time

Powers, Processes, and Time

Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism

Non‐Humeantheories of natural necessity

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