Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization

Palmeter, David; Mavroidis, Petros C.

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139177931

Cited by 103 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The WTO's legal process is explained in more detail by Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004). Davis (2012) provides a recent overview of political science research on WTO dispute settlement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

102

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The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to some caveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. (JEL F13, F14, K33, N70)

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“…The WTO's legal process is explained in more detail by Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004). Davis (2012) provides a recent overview of political science research on WTO dispute settlement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

102

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“…Four kinds of remedies may be identified at WTO law : recommendations, suggestions, compensation, and suspension of 15 Jackson et al (2002: 259); Bhala (2001: 216). 16 For comprehensive analyses of the very detailed dispute settlement procedures contained in the DSU, see generally Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004) and Waincymer (2002).…”

Section: Implementation and Remediesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-agreement retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system: an important enforcement mechanism for developing countries?

Spadano¹

2008

World Trade Review

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This article aims at analysing the merits and limits of ‘cross-retaliation’ as a mechanism to induce compliance in WTO dispute settlement, specifically from the perspective of developing countries. The focus is on cross-agreement retaliation, in particular with respect to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as this seems to be the most ‘promising’ area for developing countries. Although there are several legal, economic, and administrative difficulties related to the implementation of a suspension of TRIPS obligations and there is so far no practical experience, this seems to remain an interesting option for developing countries – or at least for the largest ones among them – wishing to obtain greater leverage in the system.

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“…Such trade measures are also possible in cases of non-compliance with WTO regulatory agreements. This key element in the enforcement of regulatory agreements in the WTO is known as cross-retaliation (WTO 1995;Palmeter and Mavroidis 1999). This enables states to increase the credibility of regulatory commitments.…”

Section: Judicialization In the Wto And International Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The EU regulatory trade agenda and the quest for WTO enforcement

̈vre¹

2006

Journal of European Public Policy

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The European Union (EU) has increasingly called for regulatory agreements in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in areas such as investment, competition, environment, and labour. Why has the EU attempted to satisfy such new demands by pursuing regulatory goals within the WTO rather than within other international organizations? I suggest two reasons for the EU's choice of the WTO. First, the nature of issue linkage in international trade negotiations has changed from exclusive exchanges of market access to the exchange of market access for regulation. Owing to the diversity of domestic constituency demands and consensus decision-making, the EU is particularly reliant on such broad issue linkages. And second, judicialization and the possibility of cross-retaliation in the WTO have enhanced the credibility of WTO commitments, increasing the organization's attractiveness for issue linkages across policy fields. I show how these two factors have contributed to the EU's attempt to place regulatory issues on the agenda of the Doha Development Round.

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Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization

Cited by 103 publications

References 15 publications

Is the WTO Passé?

Is the WTO Passé?

Cross-agreement retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system: an important enforcement mechanism for developing countries?

The EU regulatory trade agenda and the quest for WTO enforcement

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